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Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and
Cognitive Science
Rebecca Tushnet*
Trademark dilution is a cause of action for interfering with the uniqueness
of a trademark. For example, consumers would probably not think that "Kodak
soap" was produced by the makers of Kodak cameras, but its presence in the
market would diminish the uniqueness of the original Kodak mark. Trademark
owners think dilution is harmful but have had difficulty explaining why. Many
courts have therefore been reluctant to enforce dilution laws, even while legis-
latures have enacted more of them over the past half century. Courts and
commentators have now begun to use psychological theories, drawing on asso-
ciationist models of cognition, to explain how a trademark can be harmed by the
existence of similar marks even when consumers can readily distinguish the
marks from one another and thus are not confused.
Though the cognitive theory of dilution is internally consistent and appeals
to the authority of science, it does not rest on sufficient empirical evidence to
justify its adoption. Moreover, the harms it identifies do not generally come
from commercial competitors but from free speech about trademarked products.
As a result, even a limited dilution law should be held unconstitutional under
current First Amendment commercial-speech doctrine. In the absence of con-
stitutional invalidation, the cognitive explanation of dilution is likely to change
the law for the worse. Rather than working like fingerprint evidence-which
ideally produces more evidence about already-defined crimes-psychological
explanations of dilution are more like economic theories in antitrust, which
changed the definition of actionable restraints of trade. Given the empirical and
normative flaws in the cognitive theory, using it to fill dilution's theoretical
vacuum would be a mistake.
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Michigan's Spring 2007 Intellectual Property Workshop. Special thanks to participants at the
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I. Introduction
Law attempts to shape human behavior and therefore can benefit from
behavioral science. Psychology and economics can clarify legal concepts
like intent and damages, and can predict the consequences of various regu-
latory regimes, guiding lawmakers as they seek specific goals. But jurists
and legislators must be aware of the limits of science. Laboratory results
may not reflect real-world experience. And even the most thorough model of
behavior cannot tell us what laws are just.
Cognitive science is especially attractive to trademark law because
trademark protection is premised on a psychological assumption: exposure to
a mark will trigger ideas and emotions in the mind of a consumer.
Traditionally, trademark law has measured these responses through
circumstantial evidence and consumer-response surveys, but in recent years,
research advances have promised to replace intuitions, whether courts' or
consumers', with hard facts.
Neuromarketing, the investigation of marketing and branding
techniques through observation of brain activity rather than consumer self-
reports, is the most recent contender in the search for greater understanding
of consumer behavior. Among other things, it illuminates the common wis-
dom that first impressions are crucial. Researchers can now establish that it
only takes fifty milliseconds-a twentieth of a second-for consumers to
form opinions about Web sites.' Once such an opinion is formed, cognitive
biases make it easier for consumers to keep believing than to change their
minds.2
Neuromarketing also appeals to the idea that there is an objective truth
behind intangible brand values.3 It's well known that people like Pepsi better
than Coke until they know what it is they're drinking, at which point
1. See Gitte Lindgaard et al., Attention Web Designers: You Have 50 Milliseconds to Make a
Good First Impression!, 25 BEHAV. & INFO. TECH. 115, 115 (2006) (stating the results of a study on
visual appeal); cf MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING
12-13 (2005) (citing Nalini Ambady & Robert Rosenthal, Half a Minute: Predicting Teacher
Evaluations from Thin Slices of Nonverbal Behavior and Physical Attractiveness, 64 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 431, 431 (1993)) (observing that students viewing a few seconds
of a teacher with the sound turned off produce basically the same ratings of her effectiveness as
students having her for a full semester).
2. See Michael Hopkin, Web Users Judge Sites in the Blink of an Eye, NATURE NEWS, Jan. 13,
2006, http://www.nature.com/news/2006/060109/full/060109-13.html ("[I]f you can snare people
with an attractive design, they are more likely to overlook other minor faults with [a Web] site, and
may rate its actual content ... more favourably. This is because of 'cognitive bias' . . . . People
enjoy being right, so continuing to use a website that gave a good first impression helps to 'prove'
to themselves that they made a good initial decision. The phenomenon pervades our society .... ).
3. In a 2002 press release, Emory University's neuromarketing research institute claimed it
could "identify patterns of brain activity that reveal how a consumer is actually evaluating a
product, object or advertisement... to help marketers better create products and services and to
design more effective marketing campaigns." Douglas Rushkoff, Reading the Consumer Mind: The
Age ofNeuromarketing Has Dawned, N.Y. PRESS, Feb. 17, 2004 (omission in original), available at
http://www.nypress.com/print.cfrn?contentid=9637.
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preferences shift to Coke. Part of what people are drinking is the trademark.
Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) shows that different areas in the brain
light up in blinded versus nonblinded taste tests.4 Positive associations with
the brand change the experience of tasting soda, evoking memories along
with immediate sensory impressions.5 Neuroscience thus promises to explain
why we buy and to give advertisers information about consumers' brains that
consumers themselves don't know. Much of this information is proprietary
and inaccessible to academic research, but some is publicly available. Part II
of this Article reviews the new theories of trademark value and their relation-
ship to cognitive science.
Part III explains how some people have used cognitive science to
explain the doctrine of trademark dilution, which protects against
nonconfusing uses of a mark that nonetheless interfere with that mark's
distinctiveness. Classic hypothetical examples of dilutive uses include Buick
aspirin and Kodak pianos.6 The first federal dilution law was enacted in
1995; 7 along with its state predecessors, it was hampered by the absence of a
convincing justification for an expansive right to suppress nondeceptive uses
of a mark.8 Trademark dilution has been subjected to persistent criticisms:
that it is not well defined and that as best as it can be identified, it still isn't
harmful.
Cognitive models offer hope of answering these objections by
conceiving of dilution as an increase in mental or internal search costs. 9
4. See Samuel M. McClure et al., Neural Correlates of Behavioral Preference for Culturally
Familiar Drinks, 44 NEURON 379, 379 (2004).
5. Id. at 385.
6. See Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1031 (2d Cir.
1989) (listing examples of such "hypothetical anomalies" whose use leads to the "whittling away of
an established trademark's selling power" (quoting New York legislative history)).
7. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (FTDA), Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c) (West Supp. 2007)).
8. See generally Clarisa Long, Dilution, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1029, 1031-32 (2006)
(documenting that after an initial spike of successful dilution claims, courts quickly began imposing
substantial barriers to success on dilution claims, culminating in a surprisingly low success rate).
9. See, e.g., Jerre B. Swann, Sr., Dilution Redefined for the Year 2002, 92 TRADEMARK REP.
585, 585 (2002) [hereinafter Swann, Dilution Redefined] ("[A] growing body of knowledge as to
how the mind stores and retrieves brand information-the cognitive psychology of trademarks-has
immense potential for explaining dilution theory in a marketplace context."); Jacob Jacoby, Dilution
in Light of Victoria's Secret: The Psychology, Varieties and Measurement of Trademark Dilution 9-
11 (N.Y. Univ. Ctr. for Law & Bus. Working Paper Series, No. CLB-03-020, 2003) [hereinafter
Jacoby, Dilution in Light], available at http://w4.stem.nyu.edu/emplibrary/03-020.pdf (arguing that
dilution has always been a psychological construct). These articles are part of a growing literature
on trademark law and cognitive psychology. See, e.g., Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and the
Burdened Imagination, 69 BROOK. L. REv. 827, 837, 917 (2004) (arguing for greater reliance in
trademark cases on cognitive science); Jacob Jacoby, The Psychological Foundations of Trademark
Law: Secondary Meaning, Genericism, Fame, Confusion and Dilution, 91 TRADEMARK REP. 1013
(2001) [hereinafter Jacoby, Psychological Foundations] (considering multiple aspects of trademark
through the lens of cognitive psychology); Chi-Ru Jou, The Perils of a Mental Association Standard
of Liability: The Case Against the Subliminal Confusion Cause of Action, 11 VA. J.L. & TECH. 2,
15-18 (2006) (discussing cognitive heuristics and biases triggered by trademarks); Jeremy N. Sheff,
2008]
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Consumers allegedly have more difficulty recalling, recognizing, and pro-
ducing a diluted trademark, and correspondingly are less likely to purchase
products or services branded with that mark. If the new cognitive account of
dilution were to be accepted by courts, it could produce significant expan-
sions in the scope of trademark rights under both federal and state laws.
The relevant legal concepts predate this new branch of marketing
science, however, and do not map onto the research in the convenient ways
dilution's proponents have so far asserted. Part IV therefore questions the
descriptive accuracy of the cognitive/internal-search-costs model. Major
problems include insufficient attention to the contexts in which consumers
encounter trademarks in the real world, misinterpretation of research into
word frequency and associations, and failure to grapple with the possibility
that what the law calls dilution may sometimes improve consumers'
memories for a mark. This Part also discusses the concept of tarnishment,
for which empirical evidence is limited, and special problems related to con-
sumer surveys seeking to uncover dilution.
Part V, accepting for the sake of argument the cognitive model's
descriptive accuracy, deals with its normative implications-especially what
it portends for the scope of the dilution right. We should not readily assume
that if the law differs from what cognitive science tells us, we should change
the law to conform to the "objective" truth of the human brain. The most
significant issue is that the supposed neurological correlates of dilution are
not congruent with the commercial uses of a mark that dilution law targets.
Revamping dilution to map it onto the psychologically based mental-search-
costs theory would require us to suppress a lot of what is conventionally un-
derstood to be free speech. If we leave dilution's scope as is, however, it is
so underinclusive that it fails the Supreme Court's test for regulations of
nondeceptive commercial speech. As a result, there is no configuration of
dilution law compatible with current First Amendment doctrine.
Part VI concludes that dilution, if it survives constitutional scrutiny,
should best be understood as an extremely limited right against free riding,
not necessarily corresponding to any readily identifiable interference with
marketers' "ownership" of consumer beliefs. Dilution is, ultimately, an un-
derevidenced concept and one that invites socially wasteful litigation. Thus,
if courts sustain dilution laws against First Amendment challenges, they
should nonetheless interpret dilution narrowly whenever possible. Given
courts' historical reluctance to deny a remedy when they perceive harm to
The (Boundedly) Rational Basis of Trademark Liability, 15 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 331, 333
(2007) (arguing that cognitive psychology "provide[s] an elegant and robust framework for the
positive analysis of all varieties of trademark cases"); Jerre B. Swann, An Interdisciplinary
Approach to Brand Strength, 96 TRADEMARK REP. 943, 945 (2006) [hereinafter Swann,
Interdisciplinary Approach] ("Largely, the developments in the 'sciences' of trademarks appear to
support existing legal formulations. They additionally possess untapped potential in terms of
leading to more predictable, accurate and consumer-beneficial outcomes in trademark conflicts, and
they may even presage a new era in the scope of brand protection.").
[Vol. 86:507
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trademark owners, it is a mistake to endorse a theory that holds that unau-
thorized use of a mark always risks harm, even if we also have limiting
doctrines to prevent relief in defined circumstances where the harm is bal-
anced by some identified social benefit.
The use and misuse of cognitive science to explain trademark doctrines
offer insight into the broader question of what empirical scientific research
can tell us about legal doctrine. Neuroscience, like behavioral economics, is
increasingly being offered as a source of wisdom to guide legal doctrine. 10
As happened with economic analysis in antitrust law, cognitive science is
being imported into trademark law in order to convert vague, intuitive con-
cepts into objective rules, generating new law along the way. In antitrust,
such scientism led to a rollback of regulation, whereas in trademark it seem-
ingly points to a significant expansion of the law. Here, however, there are
significant empirical uncertainties, as well as normative problems with
treating consumers' mental images of marks as things that can be owned by
other entities. We should therefore hesitate to adopt the cognitive model as
legal truth.
II. The Buy Button
We live in a time of persistent advertising clutter. Brands proliferate,
and advertising proliferates even faster. Consumers are inundated with ads,
not just in traditional media but in bathroom stalls, sidewalk decals, even ads
covering the paint strips in parking lots." Advertisers shout louder and
louder, trying to win attention in a crowded field, whether it is NASCAR
sponsorships, television commercials, or Times Square:
10. See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARv. L. REV. 1489, 1570-72 (2005)
(arguing for changes in FCC policy based on cognitive studies of racial bias); cf Stephen J. Morse,
Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
397, 397 (2006) (criticizing recent efforts to apply neuroscience to theories of criminal
responsibility).
11. See, e.g., Laura Petrecca, Product Placement-You Can't Escape It, USA TODAY, Oct. 11,
2006, at BI ("Advertising is intruding on more previously untouched comers of life, including
novels, hotel shower curtains, school buses and the bellies of pregnant women. Golfer Fred
Couples is often followed around the course by a gaggle of [women] paid to wear the name
Bridgestone Golf, his sponsor.").
2008]
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With all that clutter, it's hard to catch a consumer's attention. 13
Modem marketing science promises to cut through the clutter: "In the
not-too-distant future, firms will be able to tell precisely if an advertising
campaign or product redesign triggers the brain activity and neurochemical
release associated with memory and action." 14 Much of branding is a matter
of memory, corresponding to what lawyers call acquired distinctiveness in
12. Times Square on Flickr, http://www.flickr.com/photos/stignygaard/50267318 (licensed
through Creative Commons, see Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic, http://creative
commons.org/licenses/by/2.0/deed.en).
13. See, e.g., KEN SACHARIN, ATTENTION! HOW TO INTERRUPT, YELL, WHISPER, AND TOUCH
CONSUMERS 3 (2001) ("[T]he power of marketing communications is eroding from lack of
attention."); Gerald Zaltman & Robin Higie Coulter, Seeing the Voice of the Customer: Metaphor-
Based Advertising Research, J. ADVERTISING RES., July-Aug. 1995, at 35, 36 (explaining that "time
famine" makes it "increasingly difficult for advertisers to capture consumers' attention and
information-processing time").
14. Melanie Wells, In Search of the Buy Button, FORBES, Sept. 1, 2003, at 62, 64 (quoting
James Bailey, professor of organizational behavior at George Washington University). See
generally GERALD ZALTMAN, How CUSTOMERS THINK: ESSENTIAL INSIGHTS INTO THE MIND OF
THE MARKET (2003) (using neuroscience as part of marketing analysis). The promise may be
overstated; there is a long history in marketing of discoveries that will supposedly guarantee access
to consumers' minds. See, e.g., VANCE PACKARD, THE HIDDEN PERSUADERS 3-10 (rev. ed. 1981)
(criticizing advertisers' use of strategies derived from psychiatry and social science that bypass
consumers' rational choices in favor of altering "the fabric of men's minds" (quoting the president
of the Public Relations Society of America)).
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trademark, and science offers increasingly sophisticated understandings of
memory's relationship to emotion and its effects on purchasing decisions. 5
Among other things, cognitive research into the way trademarks affect
thinking offers hard evidence for the proposition that objective product at-
tributes are not crucial-indeed, not even important-to many consumers.
"[P]eople choose Ben & Jerry's ice cream largely for reasons other than
taste."' 16 That's the example offered by Clinton Kilts, an Emory behavioral
scientist, who reassures citizens that companies will respond to "a longing
for good corporate citizenship" if it is revealed as a physical artifact in the
mind.17 Apparently, companies would believe in the importance of Ben &
Jerry's principles to consumers if it were neurologically demonstrated,
whereas consumers' expressed preferences are unconvincing. 18  Marketers
are not alone in assigning perhaps undue weight to neuroscientific results:
one study shows that offering neuroscience as a justification for an obviously
flawed explanation of human behavior causes subjects to overlook the
flaws.' 9
Still, neurological research has produced results. As noted in Part I, it
has identified a physical correlate to the well-known finding that people like
Coke better than Pepsi in nonblinded taste tests but reverse their preferences
in blind taste tests. 20 They are drinking the good memories associated with
15. See Bruce F. Hall, A New Model for Measuring Advertising Effectiveness, J. ADVERTISING
RES., Mar.-Apr. 2002, at 23, 24 ("'Rational' cognitive processes are not the primary drivers of
purchase behavior through which advertising operates. They are in fact outcomes of a complex
process of perception, experience, and memory-a process that is driven primarily by emotions and
feelings.").
16. David Wahlberg, Advertisers Probe Brains, Raise Fears, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 1,
2004, at Q1.
17. Id.
18. As one mild skeptic says, "[T]here's something absurd about the way these imaging studies
use brain images to validate subjective experience. It's as if we're not sure if we can believe in the
enjoyment of ice cream on its own terms." Daniel Engber, Thinking in Tongues: What Can We
Learn from a Babbling Brain?, SLATE, Nov. 17, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2153947. For other
examples of the idea that brain scans provide unique access to truth, see Clive Thompson, There's a
Sucker Born in Every Medial Prefrontal Cortex, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2003, § 6 (Magazine), at 54
("M.R.I. scanning offers the promise of concrete facts-an unbiased glimpse at a consumer's mind
in action. To an M.R.I. machine, you cannot misrepresent your responses. Your medial prefrontal
cortex will start firing when you see something you adore [like Playboy], even if you claim not to
like it.") and Deborah L. Vence, Pick Someone's Brain: Neurological Research Seeks Brand
Effects, MARKETING NEWS, May 1, 2006, at 11, 12 ("[Neurologist Marco lacoboni says that people]
tell [marketers] what (they think) they are supposed to say, but the brain tells a different story.
Brain data shows what people really like.").
19. Deena Skolnick Weisberg et al., The Seductive Allure of Neuroscience Explanations, 20 J.
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 4, on file with author) (finding that
irrelevant references to neuroscience made laypeople and students in a neuroscience course believe
bad explanations for psychological phenomena and noting that "people often find neuroscience
information alluring because it interferes with their abilities to judge the quality of the psychological
explanations that contain this information").
20. See, e.g., Sanjoy Ghose & Oded Lowengart, Taste Tests: Impacts of Consumer Perceptions
and Preferences on Brand Positioning Strategies, 10 J. TARGETING, MEASUREMENT & ANALYSIS
20081
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Coke and its marketing-they are tasting the trademark.21 Though previous
studies have not used MRIs, they confirm that consumers transfer feelings
about advertising, packaging, and trademarks to the product itself.22 Food
tastes better to children when it's wrapped in a McDonald's wrapper. 3 A
number of years ago, I wrote to Ben & Jerry's asking if it paid extra for the
rights to call one flavor Coffee Heath Bar Crunch. The response was that it
did. The company had experimented with selling the same recipe, including
Heath Bars, under the name Coffee Toffee and discovered that people liked
the ice cream better when it was called Coffee Heath Bar Crunch.
Perhaps most disturbingly, other research reveals that people can be
induced to change their perceptions, both evaluative (which of three lines on
a page is longest?) 24 and affective (was this a good movie?), simply by being
exposed to contrary opinions, including advertising.25 As one researcher
FOR MARKETING 26, 30 (2001) ("In a blind taste test, Diet Pepsi was preferred by 51 per cent of the
subjects while Diet Coke was preferred by 44 per cent. In contrast, a branded taste test resulted in
Diet Pepsi being preferred by 23 per cent with Diet Coke being preferred by 65 per cent.").
21. See McClure et al., supra note 4, at 385, 383-85 (noting the "wealth of cultural meaning"
the Coke and Pepsi brands possess).
22. See, e.g., ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 164 (4th ed. 2001)
(noting that cars advertised in pictures with beautiful women are judged to be faster and better
designed than cars advertised without accompanying beautiful women); GLADWELL, supra note 1,
at 161-63 (noting that inexpensive brandy performs differently in taste tests depending on how
elaborate the bottle is); id. at 163 (noting that a 15% increase in yellow color on soda cans affects
perception of lemon-lime flavor); id. at 163-64 (noting that changing a literal depiction of a human
on a food package to a cartoon harms the product's selling power); see also SETH GODIN, ALL
MARKETERS ARE LIARS: THE POWER OF TELLING AUTHENTIC STORIES IN A LoW-TRUST WORLD
3-5 (2005) (discussing similar research results involving wine glasses); Torben Hansen, The Effect
of Physical Surroundings in Usage Situations on Consumer Perception of Food Quality and on
Consumer Emotions, 15 J. INT'L CONSUMER MARKETING 31, 31 (2002) (observing that elegant
physical surroundings have positive effects on perceived quality and pleasure in food tasting).
23. See Thomas N. Robinson et al., Effects of Fast Food Branding on Young Children's Taste
Preferences, 161 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 792, 794-95 (2007) (comparing
three- to five-year-old children's evaluations of identical foods, some from McDonald's and some
from a grocery store, and finding that children with more exposure to McDonald's and McDonald's
advertising had stronger preferences for the versions served in McDonald's packaging).
24. For example, people are more likely to see two objects as similar if they're told (falsely)
that others have seen them that way, even when their judgments are private and not subject to social
sanctions for nonconformity. MRI scans suggest that the effect is perceptual-it occurs in visual-
processing areas of the brain-and not simply a matter of subjects altering their reports of what they
see. See Gregory S. Berns et al., Neurobiological Correlates of Social Conformity and
Independence During Mental Rotation, 58 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 245, 251 (2005). Ads
appearing to represent others' opinions can thus change our own. See Wells, supra note 14, at 65-
66; see also Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS L.J.
983, 1010-11 (2005) (discussing research on how perceived popularity of a belief can change
individuals' perceptions of its truth); Matthew J. Salganik et al., Experimental Study of Inequality
and Unpredictability in an Artificial Cultural Market, 311 SCIENCE 854, 854-55 (2006) (same for
music ratings).
25. See ZALTMAN, supra note 14, at 183, 182-83 (citing studies demonstrating advertising's
ability to "infiltrate memory" and even to create memories of events that never occurred); see also
id. at 12-13, 166-67, 180-81 (describing various successful experiments in manipulating memories
about products or services); Kathryn A. Braun & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Advertising's Misinformation
Effect, 12 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 569, 586 (1998) ("[M]isinformation received following a
[Vol. 86:507
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comments, "From an advertising and marketing perspective, this is a major
breakthrough: the work showed that exposure to advertising can transform
'objective' sensory information, such as taste, in a consumer's memory, prior
to the judgment process, and after the consumer had tasted the product."26
Simple repetition of advertising improves its credibility.27  People
generally play along with advertising, making efforts to confirm advertising-
generated expectations and to avoid feeling like a dupe who believed an un-
true claim. 28 Although not all advertising works, advertising in general is
quite successful at creating positive feelings associated with consumption.
We are only human in our tendencies to transfer positive emotions from
funny or appealing ads to the products and services they tout.
These phenomena can be linked to neurological changes (which, as
noted above, makes them seem more real):
Many seemingly rational decisions are reflexive snap judgments,
shaped by networks of neurons acting in concert. These orchestras of
cells are surprisingly malleable, readily responding to the influence of
experience.
Moreover, researchers suspect that the inescapable influence of
marketing does more than change minds. It may alter the brain.
direct experience with a product altered the recollections respondents made about that product.");
Kathryn A. Braun et al., Make My Memory: How Advertising Can Change Our Memories of the
Past, 19 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 1, 17, 17-18 (2002) (discussing research finding that "featuring
impossible events in autobiographical advertising can cause people to believe they had experienced
the events"); Kathryn A. Braun, Postexperience Advertising Effects on Consumer Memory, 25 J.
CONSUMER RES. 319, 332 (1999) (finding that advertising can induce consumers to change taste
judgments from negative to positive); Kathryn A. Braun-LaTour et al., How and When Advertising
Can Influence Memory for Consumer Experience, J. ADVERTISING, Winter 2004, at 7, 19
(observing that ads changed memories to be consistent with the advertised claims, inducing people
to believe they had personally met Bugs Bunny at a Disney park); Hall, supra note 15, at 25
("[P]ost-experience exposure [to ads] is also subject to 'interpretation.' The advertisement not only
influences the consumer to feel that the sensory or social experience was a good one, but it also
provides reasons to believe that it was. As with pre-experience advertising, if the advertisement
fails to provide or imply a reason-to-believe, the interpreter will supply one.").
26. Hall, supra note 15, at 26.
27. E.g., Scott A. Hawkins & Stephen J. Hoch, Low-Involvement Learning: Memory Without
Evaluation, 19 J. CONSUMER RES. 212, 223 (1992); Scott A. Hawkins et al., Low-Involvement
Learning: Repetition and Coherence in Familiarity and Belief 11 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 1, 2
(2001); cf Gita Venkataramani Johar et al., MAPping the Frontiers: Theoretical Advances in
Consumer Research on Memory, Affect, and Persuasion, 33 J. CONSUMER RES. 139, 143 (2006)
("Mere exposure to a product results in an increased preference for that product." (citation
omitted)).
28. See John Deighton, The Interaction of Advertising and Evidence, 11 J. CONSUMER RES.
763, 763 (1984) (describing a two-step model of consumer behavior in which an individual
entertains a tentative hypothesis about a product and then attempts to confirm it); cf Stephen J.
Hoch & John Deighton, Managing What Consumers Learn from Experience, J. MARKETING, Apr.
1989, at 1, 1 ("Learning from self-generated experience with a product or service is not a simple
process of discovering objective truth. It is, to a greater or lesser extent, open to influence[,] and the
consumer's confidence in the objectivity of such learning can be illusory.").
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Just as practicing the piano or learning to read can physically alter
areas of the cerebral cortex, the intense, repetitive stimulation of
marketing might shape susceptible brain circuits involved in decision-
making.29
Marketers therefore routinely define successful brands in terms of
property-not in the trademarks, as lawyers might, but in the minds of
consumers. As the picture below shows, marketers maintain that "[t]he
strongest brands in the world own a place in the consumer's mind., 30
__Coke t BM
Yet the mind is not infinitely capacious. In the diagram above, for
example, Pepsi and Apple might be able to occupy territory only by
displacing other brands. Perhaps worse, someone might appropriate Xerox
for an unrelated product to get instant access to a spot already occupied by
Xerox in a consumer's mental landscape. This raises the possibility of a
tragedy of the mental commons, in which a consumer's mind is overpopu-
lated with meaning and her understanding of a brand descends into
incoherence. Propertization of that meaning, by hypothesis, ought to lead to
wise management, fighting the clutter of ads that barrages us from every
angle.
29. Robert Lee Hotz, Mapping the Mind: Searching for the Why of Buy, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 27,
2005, at A26.
30. SCOTT M. DAVIS, BRAND ASSET MANAGEMENT: DRIVING PROFITABLE GROWTH
THROUGH YOUR BRANDS 3 (2000); see also DOUGLAS B. HOLT, How BRANDS BECOME ICONS:
THE PRINCIPLES OF CULTURAL BRANDING 15 (2004) ("Since the 1970s, this provocative image-
of brands contesting for scarce mental real estate in consumers' minds-has been the most
influential idea in branding."); AL RIES & JACK TROUT, POSITIONING: THE BATTLE FOR YOUR
MIND 58 (20th anniversary ed. 2001) ("The power of the organization is derived from... [t]he
position that the product owns in the prospect's mind."); ZALTMAN, supra note 14, at 71 ("The
unconscious mind represents a significant frontier where marketers may establish secure
beachheads of competitive advantage. Certainly no firm can claim to understand consumers
without colonizing this land of opportunity."). Though Zaltman disavows mind control, he does
suggest that neuromarketing and related techniques can make marketing more effective across the
board, reducing product-failure rates from their current level of 80%. See id. at 127, 289. This
teleological approach, suggesting that properly managed consumers will find a way to buy more of
everything, posits an end state of marketing nirvana even while it concedes some agency to
consumers.
31. RIES & TROUT, supra note 30, at 29.
[Vol. 86:507
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Because marketing is never-ending, there are always interlopers fighting
for neural territory. If a defendant's activities interfere with existing
marketing-generated wiring, there is reason to claim trademark dilution or
possibly even infringement. Or so trademark owners would like us to
believe.
III. The Appeal of the Internal-Search-Costs Model
Everyone agrees that trademark infringement-use of a mark in a way
likely to confuse consumers about who is responsible for the quality of a
product or service-is harmful. The currently dominant explanation uses the
language of economics: confusion about source or sponsorship harms pro-
ducers by decreasing their incentives to invest in consistent quality and
harms consumers by deceiving them into buying unwanted and inferior
products. A successful trademark regime decreases consumer search costs
because the trademark serves as shorthand for the qualities the consumer
seeks and thus increases efficiency.32
In 1927, amid a boom in national advertising, Frank Schechter
supplemented traditional confusion with a new theory of harm to a valuable
mark.33 Dilution, he argued, was interference with the uniqueness of a mark,
which was the key to its selling power.34 Even without confusion between
Buick cars and Buick aspirin, the existence of the latter would make the for-
mer less able to sell cars. Many states accepted this theory in subsequent
decades and enacted laws providing for relief against dilution. 35 In 1995,
Congress followed with the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA), which
created a federal right against dilution of a famous mark.36 The laws did not
32. As Mark McKenna persuasively argues, this consumer-protection justification, currently
couched in terms of economic efficiency, was not the traditional understanding of the wrong of
trademark infringement, though infringement law has successfully been retrofitted and reorganized
around it. See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1839 (2007). As McKenna explains, at the beginning of the twentieth century,
trademarks generally protected only against unfair competition-use of a confusingly similar mark
on the same products as those produced by the trademark owner, leading to diverted sales. Id. at
1900. Industrial manufacturing and marketing led to situations in which use of a confusingly
similar mark on different products could potentially harm the trademark owner, either by risking its
reputation if the other products were shoddy or by precluding it from entering a new field that
would otherwise make business sense, as when a pancake-mix manufacturer wanted to use its mark
on pancake syrup. Id. at 1901. Courts eventually began to treat this type of consumer confusion as
trademark infringement even in the absence of direct competition. Id. at 1901-02.
33. See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813
(1927).
34. See id. at 831-33.
35. See Gregg Duffey, Trademark Dilution Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of J995:
You've Come a Long Way Baby-Too Far, Maybe?, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 133, 140-41 (1997)
(discussing state approaches to trademark dilution).
36. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (FTDA), Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (West Supp. 2007)).
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define dilution in any helpful fashion, 37 and the mechanisms by which harm
could take place in the absence of confusion were difficult to articulate.
Courts have struggled mightily to figure out what trademark dilution is
and what harm it does.38 Clarisa Long has documented substantial swings in
the success rate for dilution cases, culminating for now in apparent disen-
chantment with dilution as a cause of action in most circumstances.39
Recently enacted amendments to the FTDA have eliminated some of the spe-
cific doctrines courts have used to cabin dilution,40 but many uncertainties of
definition and proof remain.
Enter the cognitive-processing model. It offers an attractive definition
of dilution, one that creates a pleasing symmetry between dilution and the
standard-now "external"-search-cost model of infringement. Dilution
imposes mental-"internal"-search costs on consumers, which is why dilu-
tion is harmful. Judge Posner has ably set forth the fundamentals of the
cognitive model, and Jacob Jacoby, a prominent (if not always successful)4'
37. State laws generally spoke of"injury to business reputation" and "dilution of the distinctive
quality of a mark" but did not define those concepts further, contributing to judicial resistance to
dilution. See William G. Barber, The Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005: Breathing Life
Back into the Federal Dilution Statute, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1113,
1114, 1113-15 (2006). The FTDA originally defined dilution as "the lessening of the capacity of a
famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services," though this wording has now been
changed. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000), amended by Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-312, § 3(e), 120 Stat. 1730, 1733 (striking out the definition of "dilution").
38. See Christine Haight Farley, Why We Are Confused About the Trademark Dilution Law, 16
FoRDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1175 (2006) (collecting examples).
39. Long, supra note 8; see also Swann, Dilution Redefined, supra note 9, at 597-98
(discussing judicial distrust of dilution). Long evaluates only federal dilution claims, not state-law
dilution claims litigated in federal court, see Long, supra note 8, at 1038, which may lead her to
understate the utility of dilution claims to plaintiffs. See Robert C. Bird, The Impact of the Moseley
Decision on Trademark Dilution Law 8 (May 17, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-903003 (discussing several successful state-law-only
dilution claims).
40. For an overview, see Barton Beebe, A Defense of the New Federal Trademark Antidilution
Law, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1143 (2006). The amendments specify that
plaintiffs need only show likely dilution, not actual dilution, overturning Moseley v. V Secret
Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003), and that a famous trademark is federally protected against
dilution whether it is inherently distinctive or has acquired distinctiveness, overturning Second
Circuit precedent, see, e.g., TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Commc'ns Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 96 (2d Cir.
2001). See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 § 2 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(1)
(West Supp. 2007)). The amendments also provide that only wide recognition among the general
consuming public makes a mark "famous" such that it qualifies for federal dilution protection,
overturning cases that recognized "niche" fame, see id. § 1125(c)(2)(A); reorganize the available
defenses for activities, such as comparative advertising and parody, see id. § I 125(c)(3); and set out
factors for courts to consider in assessing dilution by blurring, see id. § 1125(c)(2)(B). Though
these changes will provide grist for years of the litigation mill, they do not change the ways in
which cognitive theories can be applied to prove or infer the existence of dilution.
41. See, e.g., Nat'l Football League Props., Inc. v. Prostyle, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 665, 668-73
(E.D. Wis. 1999) (rejecting Jacoby's dilution survey and finding that Jacoby's general explanations
of the underlying cognitive theory were inadmissible); Barnes Group Inc. v. Connell Ltd. P'ship,
793 F. Supp. 1277, 1293-94 (D. Del. 1992) (rejecting Jacoby's theories of dilution based on
cognitive psychology as inapplicable to the present case).
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trademark expert, has seized on Posner's explanations as confirmation of his
framework for measuring dilution experimentally.
A. Blurring
In Ty Inc. v. Perryman,42 a case about a Web site that sold Beanie
Babies and other stuffed bean-bag animals, Judge Posner reiterated the
standard search-costs justification for protecting trademarks against
43infringement. He then contrasted infringement to dilution, which he saw as
dealing with internal search costs-difficulties not in figuring out whether
two products or services are from the same source, but in retrieving the mark
from memory in the first place. 4
In the cognitive model, 45 blurring takes place when a single term
activates multiple, nonconfusing associations in a consumer's mind.
Meanings or concepts, including sounds, images, and other sensory
impressions, are linked by mental networks. Concepts are activated through
links in the network, triggering related concepts.46 Activation happens very
fast, and if it does not continue, an unreinforced word or concept can die
away. For example, because we process sounds in sequence, neighborhoods
of words starting with an initial he sound will be activated when we hear
he-.47 When we hear the rest of the word hello, help will die away and hello,
with its attendant meanings, will be activated.48
Blurring involves relatively extended activation of two different
meanings for a mark until the consumer sorts out the proper referent. The
basic theory is that an unrelated, nonconfusing mark similar to a famous
mark adds new associations to a preexisting network, which slows processing
time, especially if the junior mark has a very different meaning than the
42. 306 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2002).
43. Id. at 510.
44. Id. at 510-12.
45. There are other theories of language and cognition. The new trademark-dilution theory is
based on an associationist model of cognition, which is distinct from structuralist, universal
grammar models. Because the latter have not yet produced theories of trademarks, and it is not
clear that they would have much to say about trademark meanings specifically, I focus only on the
associationist model.
46. See, e.g., JOHN R. ANDERSON, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 183-85
(4th ed. 1995) (explaining the concept of spreading activation); Jacoby, Psychological Foundations,
supra note 9, at 1019-20 (same); Swann, Interdisciplinary Approach, supra note 9, at 946-47, 950
(linking spreading activation to brand association).
47. See Christine A. Sevald & Gary S. Dell, The Sequential Cuing Effect in Speech Production,
53 COGNITION 91, 110 (1994) (discussing sequential cuing).
48. See id. (modeling sequential cuing).
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senior mark.49 Like several pebbles thrown into a pond at once, activation of
different meanings causes interference with each one.50
Posner gave the example of a high-end restaurant called Tiffany's,
which would interfere with a consumer's immediate recognition of the jew-
elry store Tiffany's. 51  "Consumers will have to think harder-incur as it
were a higher imagination cost-to recognize the name as the name of the
store., 52 They will have to stop and ask themselves, "Which Tiffany's? '53 A
number of legal scholars have agreed with Judge Posner and explicitly identi-
fied the increased mental search costs for consumers as the harm of
dilution.54 Famous marks "are enormously valuable but fragile assets,
susceptible to irreversible injury from promiscuous use., 55
49. See Maureen Morrm & Jacob Jacoby, Trademark Dilution: Empirical Measures for an
Elusive Concept, 19 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 265, 267 (2000).
50. See Swann, Dilution Redefined, supra note 9, at 613 (arguing that if two brands are
associated, "discrete and (usually) consistent propositions linked to each symbol become part of a
larger, divergent array, with adverse memory consequences for both the brand concepts and each of
their separate links").
51. Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 2002). It is worth noting that there exist
multiple establishments using the name Tiffany's, but Judge Posner still felt that Tiffany's was
famous and distinctive enough to serve as an example. The failure of the prototype might be
thought to cast doubt on dilution theory generally. See David S. Welkowitz, Reexamining
Trademark Dilution, 44 VAND. L. REV. 531, 539 (1991).
52. Perryman, 306 F.3d at 511; see also Richard A. Posner, When Is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J.
LEGAL STUD. 67, 75 (1992) ("A trademark seeks to economize on information costs by providing a
compact, memorable, and unambiguous identifier of a product or service. The economy is less
when, because the trademark has other associations, a person seeing it must think for a moment
before recognizing it as the mark of the product or service.").
53. See Swam, Dilution Redefined, supra note 9, at 612 ("Upon hearing the word in an
advertisement, the consumer could not thus register an immediate, information-laden impression
favorable to the [famous trademark owner], but would have to await context to ascertain whether a
more mundane commodity was being promoted. As a 'marketing tool,' the [famous] brand would
have less utility."). Swann cites general interviews with psychologists and cognitive-psychology
texts that refer to "'response competition,' potentially resulting in 'unlearning,' or forgetting,
[which] can occur when the same cue brings to consciousness two disparate propositions or
concepts. Similarly, 'the more propositions related to a concept the less activation will be received
by each when the concept is activated."' Id. at 612-13 (foomote omitted) (quoting R. REED HUNT
& HENRY C. ELLIS, FUNDAMENTALS OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 176-77, 195 (6th ed. 1999)).
54. See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on
the Internet, 41 HOuS. L. REV. 777, 790 (2004) [hereinafter Dogan & Lemley, Consumer Search
Costs] (arguing that dilution law protects against increased search costs); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark
A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161,
1197 (2006) [hereinafter Dogan & Lemley, Right of Publicity] ("[L]ike traditional trademark law,
dilution properly understood is targeted at reducing consumer search costs."); Lee Goldman,
Proving Dilution, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 569, 576, 575-76 (2004) (asserting that the use of well-
known trademarks by other users creates "clutter" and imposes additional search costs on
consumers); Daniel Klerman, Trademark Dilution, Search Costs, and Naked Licensing, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 1759 (2006) (analyzing dilution and the naked-licensing doctrine from a search-
costs perspective); J. Thomas McCarthy, Proving a Trademark Has Been Diluted: Theories or
Facts?, 41 Hous. L. REV. 713, 727-28 (2004) ("[l]f a once-unique designation loses its
uniqueness ... it [is] harder for consumers to link that designation with a single source-the
hallmark of a strong trademark. Under this theory, dilution increases the consumer's search costs
by diffusing the identification power of that designation."); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Defining the
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In 2000, Maureen Morrin and Jacob Jacoby conducted an experiment
that can be used to bolster the internal-search-costs model. 56 The study had
participants view diluting ads for Dogiva dog biscuits, Heineken popcorn,
and Hyatt legal services. 57 The ads were "tombstone" ads-print only and
highly informational. 58 The Heineken and Hyatt ads contained prominent
disclaimers of affiliation with Heineken beer and Hyatt hotels, respectively.59
Computers measured how long it took for participants to identify the senior
marks after exposure to the junior marks. 60  Morrin and Jacoby found that
exposure to dilutive ads slowed participants' accuracy and response time in
associating some brands with product categories and attributes, such as link-
ing Godiva to chocolate and rich taste.61  Heineken beer was similarly
affected by ads for Heineken popcorn, though Hyatt hotels were not affected
by ads for Hyatt legal services.62
Exposure to dilutive ads led to an average response time of 770
milliseconds before respondents recognized the senior brand as fitting in its
category, versus 675 milliseconds after exposure to an ad for the senior brand
(reinforcement) and 748 milliseconds after exposure to unrelated ads
(control).63 (The average was driven down because ads for Hyatt legal
services improved subjects' recognition time for Hyatt hotels just as much as
ads for Hyatt hotels did.)64  Other researchers conducted paper-and-pencil
versions of the experiment using aided recall, in which respondents were re-
quired to retrieve distinctive aspects of a brand when presented with the
Limits of Free-Riding in Cyberspace: Trademark Liability for Metatagging, 33 GONZ. L. REv. 277,
307 n. 114 (1997-1998) ("Dilution by blurring is concerned with preventing the erosion of the
distinctiveness of the mark because of its use on non-related products. The 'noise' that this creates
around the mark may increase consumer search costs."); Michael Pulos, Comment, A Semiotic
Solution to the Propertization Problem of Trademark, 53 UCLA L. REV. 833, 854-55, 859-61
(2006) (adopting the search-cost model to analyze dilution). Marketing researchers have picked up
on the argument as well. See Robert A. Peterson et al., Trademark Dilution and the Practice of
Marketing, 27 J. ACAD. MARKETING SCI. 255, 260-61 (1999) (proposing the cognitive-difficulty
model of dilution as a way to understand the legal concept).
55. The United States Trademark Association Trademark Review Commission Report and
Recommendations to USTA President and Board of Directors, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 375, 455
(1987); accord Swann, Dilution Redefined, supra note 9, at 623.
56. See Morrin & Jacoby, supra note 49.
57. Id. at 268.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 269.
61. Id. at 269-70.
62. Id. at 269 tbl. 1. Survey participants exposed to Heineken popcorn agreed that Heineken
was a beer 82.8% of the time, compared to 92.1% who had not seen any Heineken ads and 90.0%
who had been exposed to a Heineken beer ad. Id.
63. Id.
64. See id. at 269 & tbl. 1.
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brand name and to retrieve the brand name when presented with the brand's
distinctive aspects.65 The results also showed measurable dilutive effects.66
Dilution proponents maintain that delayed responses, like decreased
accuracy in linking brands to categories and products, are likely to affect
purchasing decisions, given that advertisers often only have a few seconds-
or even milliseconds-to catch consumers' attention. If a dilutive use de-
familiarizes consumers with a mark, their positive emotional associations
based on familiarity may be lost, giving them less reason to choose the un-
derlying product. 67  In the lab, dilution-generated delayed response times
have been correlated with later decreases in the likelihood that subjects will
choose a diluted brand from among competing alternatives.
68
B. Tarnishment
In Posner's model, dilution by tarnishment also involves interference
with cognitive processing, but of a different kind. Judge Posner posited a
strip joint named Tiffany's and assumed that reasonable consumers do not
think it has any connection with the jewelry store.69 Nevertheless, "because
of the inveterate tendency of the human mind to proceed by association,
every time [people who know about the strip joint] think of the word
'Tiffany' their image of the fancy jewelry store will be tarnished by the
association of the word with the strip joint., 70 This "inveterate tendency"
71
can be equated to the psychological concept of activation discussed above.
A suggestive mark like Hooters, for example, activates associations to
restaurants, breasts, the color orange, owls, sexual harassment, and a variety
of other concepts.
Tarnishment is a more intuitively obvious concept than blurring, as
evidenced by the considerable debate in the literature over what blurring is,
with substantially less attention paid to tarnishment. As discussed in Part II,
emotion drives cognition, meaning that negative associations may do real,
even measurable harm, even though it is not rational to think less of
Tiffany's-the-jeweler because of the existence of the strip club Tiffany's. No
matter what people consciously believe, Tiffany's-the-strip-joint will become
65. Chris Pullig et al., Brand Dilution: When Do New Brands Hurt Existing Brands?, J.
MARKETrNG, Apr. 2006, at 52, 61.
66. See id. at 52,61-62.
67. See 43(B)log, http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2007/10/santa-clara-dilution-conference_- 07.html
(Oct. 7, 2007, 08:13 EST) (summarizing Laura Bradford's work on trademarks, emotion, and
familiarity); ef supra notes 21, 27 and accompanying text (discussing the selling power of
familiarity).
68. See Pullig et al., supra note 65, at 52, 61-62.
69. Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 2002).
70. Id.; see also Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in
Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REv. 547, 605 (2006) (endorsing a similar theory of tamishment as
interference with information transmission).
71. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
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a branch on the tree of associations connected to Tiffany's-the-jeweler, and it
will bear poisoned fruit.
Though there is room to characterize tamishment as a subset of blurring,
because they both apparently involve a proliferation of associations,
tamishment involves persistent associations with the senior mark. With a
prediluted mark like Apple or American, both trademark-related and non-
trademark concepts may be activated when we see the word, depending on
how primed we are by context. As we recognize the reference to the
trademark, unrelated concepts will not be further activated and will die away.
This is also what should eventually happen with dilution by blurring-
because there is no confusion, concepts of Tiffany's-the-jewelry-store
activated when we see Tiffany's will fade as the mind recognizes that the
subject of a particular reference is Tiffany's-the-strip-joint.
By contrast, dilution by tarnishment would mean that the idea of
Tiffany's-the-strip-joint remains at least slightly activated after a reference to
Tiffany's-the-jewelry-store, decreasing the overall positive value associated
with Tiffany's-the-jewelry-store.72  Or, to take a better example of
tarnishment, consider an ad campaign accusing jewelry stores, including
Tiffany's, of complicity in selling conflict diamonds, complete with images
of blood and slaughter. Now, reference to Tiffany's-the-jewelry-store acti-
vates both positive concepts of beauty and wealth and negative concepts of
violence and exploitation.73 Under current law, the ad campaign has a better
justification than the strip joint and will almost certainly avoid any liability,
72. Alex Simonson suggests that the very existence of a similarly branded product in a
divergent category will have tarnishing effects, even without poor quality: "[S]tudies indicate that as
the perceived fit between the product categories (of the new brand and the original brand) decreases,
the evaluation of the original product decreases, even if the brands are unrelated as to source ......
Alexander F. Simonson, How and When Do Trademarks Dilute: A Behavioral Framework to Judge
"Likelihood" of Dilution, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 149, 167 (1993) (footnotes omitted). For specific
discussion of this point, see infra subpart IV(D).
73. Related evidence comes from studies of racial stereotypes. It is well established that many
people have difficulty associating words that describe people from a group (blacks, women, gays)
with words that are inconsistent with stereotypes associated with that group; they are hundreds of
milliseconds slower and make more mistakes when asked to do stereotype-inconsistent matching.
But those reaction times can be altered-still unconsciously-by exposure to inconsistent
information, such as images of revered African-Americans and reviled whites, in order to counteract
racial bias. See Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald, On the Malleability of Automatic
Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice with Images of Admired and Disliked Individuals, 81 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 800, 800 (2001) (reporting that exposure to counterstereotypical
images reduced the delay in implicit association with regard to stereotype-inconsistent matching);
see also Irene V. Blair et al., Imagining Stereotypes Away: The Moderation of Implicit Stereotypes
Through Mental Imagery, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 828, 838 (2001) (applying a
similar methodology to words associated with stereotypes about men and women, and reporting
similar conclusions). Even with entrenched biases like those associated with race, it is possible to
change reaction times by exposing people to negative images of whites and positive images of
African-Americans-at least for a time. See Dasgupta & Greenwald, supra, at 807 (noting that the
effect persisted for at least twenty-four hours after the initial experiment). Likewise, showing




but it will tarnish the Tiffany's mark. Moreover, if the campaign mentions
Tiffany's in order to get consumers' attention even though Tiffany's is not a
unique offender, it can do perhaps unjustified harm to Tiffany's relative
74competitive position.
Though it was decided on confusion grounds, Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v.
Balducci Publications,75 a case against a humor magazine's parody ad for
Michelob Oily, is one of Jacoby's prime examples of tarnishment.76
Participants in his study were shown either an ad for Michelob Dry or the
mock ad for Michelob Oily.7" Thirty-seven percent of those shown the
Michelob Oily ad "associat[ed] a negative meaning with Michelob or
Anheuser Busch," while no one who saw a Michelob Dry ad did so. 78 Such
negative meanings attach to the senior mark directly, rather than being medi-
ated through a second, unrelated product. As Jacoby's example indicates, the
negative-association rationale for the tarnishment doctrine readily applies to
criticism or parody of trademark owners.79
C. Free Riding
Finally, Posner offers a third possible meaning of dilution, which is
simply free riding. The example is a Tiffany's restaurant in Kuala Lumpur,
which grabs some of the luster of Tiffany's-the-jeweler because of the same
tendency to make associations that explains tarnishment and blurring.8°
People in Kuala Lumpur know about the jewelry store but would never
patronize it, so no jewelry-store customers have their mental models of
Tiffany's distorted in any way.81  But noncustomers now have multiple
associations with Tiffany's, and their recognition of the famous mark is
impaired.82 Posner is dubious about this rationale,83 and the new federal
74. That arguably happened to Nike when labor activists targeted it even though its labor
practices were standard in the athletic-apparel industry; other shoe producers benefited greatly from
anti-Nike, anti-child-labor sentiment even while behaving much like Nike. See Jeff Manning, Rival
Asks Nike to Join Fight Against Sweatshops, OREGONIAN, Sept. 27, 1996, at Al (questioning
Reebok's motives for publicly inviting Nike to join a factory-monitoring system); see also UNC
Students Gather to Protest Ties to Nike, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Nov. 9, 1997, at 28 (quoting some
students who thought the protest unfairly targeted Nike since its competitors engaged in the same
behavior).
75. 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994).
76. Jacoby, Psychological Foundations, supra note 9, at 1059.
77. Id. at 1060.
78. Id. Twenty-two percent said the Michelob Oily ad made them less likely to buy Michelob,
and twenty percent said they were less likely to drink it, compared to seven and five percent,
respectively, of those who saw the Michelob Dry ad. Id. at 1061.
79. See Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 45 (2d Cir. 1994) (applying dilution to
bar a competitor's parody of John Deere's logo in a comparative ad).
80. See Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 512 (7th Cir. 2002).
81. See id.
82. Id. at 511.
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dilution law seems to have taken it off the table for federal claims, though it
may still be viable under state law. 84 This definition focuses on the mental
processes of the junior user's customers, not the senior user's, but is other-
wise quite similar to the definition of blurring.
D. Summary
The cognitive explanation of dilution has been presented to courts and
Congress as a solid empirical and theoretical justification for dilution law.
Jacoby now explicitly connects his cognitive model to Posner's internal-
search-costs formulation.86. The link from psychology to economics to law is
complete. Dilution means "slowing or interrupting the ability to recall either
a brand or its associations."87
To dilution's proponents, earlier concepts of diminishing the selling
power of a mark have simply been formalized and translated into the lan-
guage of law and economics. Like any translation, however, the new dilution
story creates new opportunities. By providing "numerically quantifiable
83. See id. at 512 (pointing out that because one prestigious name is as good as any other when
used in an unrelated market, a trademark owner could not expect to earn any significant fees from
licensing such use).
84. The amended federal law specifically covers dilution by blurring and dilution by
tarnishment and would not include Posner's third category unless it were seen as a type of blurring.
See Beebe, supra note 40, at 1164-65. Free riding might, however, still be covered by state dilution
laws. Even though Posner was not sure whether such a cause of action was justified, at least one
court has read Perryman to endorse all three types of dilution. See Best Vacuum, Inc. v. Ian
Design, Inc., No. 04 C 2249, 2005 WL 1185817, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2005).
85. See, e.g., Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005: Hearing on H.R. 683 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 43 (2005) (statement of Mark A. Lemley, Professor of Law, Stanford University),
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/printers/109th/98924.pdf ("The owners of some
famous trademarks must contend with a host of uses that may not confuse consumers, but that draw
on consumer recognition of the famous mark in a way that makes it more difficult over time for
consumers to associate the mark with a consistent brand image, ultimately raising consumer search
costs."); Brief of Amicus Curiae the International Trademark Association in Support of
Respondents at 15-16, Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003) (No. 01-1015),
reprinted in 92 TRADEMARK REP. 1139, 1161-62 (2002) [hereinafter INTA Brief] (using Morrin &
Jacoby, supra note 49, to support the proposition that creating any association with an existing mark
necessarily dilutes it).
86. See Jacoby, Dilution in Light, supra note 9, at 19-20.
87. Bird, supra note 39, at 3; see also Klerman, supra note 54, at 1764-65, 1764 & n.24
(discussing Morrin & Jacoby, though noting that their study was not designed to measure search
costs); Long, supra note 8, at 1058 n.112 (citing Morrin & Jacoby); Maureen Morrin et al.,
Determinants of Trademark Dilution, 33 J. CONSUMER REs. 248, 248 (2006) (adopting a model of
dilution as interference with recognition and recall); Pullig et al., supra note 65, at 54 (same);
Swann, Dilution Redefined, supra note 9, at 610-11 (relying on Morrin & Jacoby); Alexander
Simonson, The Impact of Identical Brand Names on the Strength of New Brands and Original
Brands: A Study of Brand Appropriation and Dilution 21-30 (1994) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Columbia University) (on file with the Texas Law Review) (linking cognitive theory
and legal concepts of dilution).
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impacts of the dilutive brand on consumers, 88 it claims to prove that dilution
is a real problem.
89
One reason cognitive models are particularly attractive to prove dilution
in trademark, as opposed to other issues, such as criminal responsibility9" or
sex discrimination, is that trademark has always dealt in theories of consumer
psychology at the general or mass level. Probabilistic causation-likely con-
fusion or likely dilution-has provided the standard for granting a plaintiff
relief.91 If we were looking at brain imaging to determine whether an
individual was criminally responsible for a particular act, neurological
evidence might not help attribute responsibility. 92 But if we are only inter-
ested in the effect of an allegedly dilutive use on the group as a whole,
systematic differences are enough to prove a legally relevant effect even if
some people are unscathed.
For dilution proponents, another considerable advantage of the search-
costs explanation is that it converts antidilution law into a protection for con-
sumers as well as for producers. After all, we know that external search
costs are inefficient and therefore welfare diminishing for consumers. 93 It
seems natural that internal search costs would also decrease efficiency.94
The cognitive theory of dilution therefore answers the common criticism that
88. Bird, supra note 39, at 14.
89. As Jerre Swann puts it, "Now, happily, cognitive psychology confirms economic theory."
Swann, Dilution Redefined, supra note 9, at 614; see also INTA Brief, supra note 85, at 14,
reprinted in 92 TRADEMARK REP. 1139, 1160 (2002) ("Dilution, indeed, is now an empirically
sustainable fact."); Simonson, supra note 72, at 149-50 (arguing that dilution is an empirical
phenomenon that can be proved using cognitive and behavioral evidence).
90. See Morse, supra note 10, at 408-10 (critiquing the use of brain-imaging evidence about
adolescent neural development to justify the result in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005),
which held that the death penalty could not constitutionally be applied to juveniles under eighteen).
91. For a brief period, federal dilution law required a showing of actual dilution, not merely
likely dilution. See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2003). Nonetheless,
even actual dilution could be shown by demonstrating an effect on a significant portion of the
exposed population, not a universal change. See id. at 433, 433-34 (discussing dilution as a
"lessening" or "reduc[tion]" of a mark's ability to identify a source, rather than a total destruction of
that ability).
92. Morse, supra note 10, at 404.
93. Some consumers may enjoy the thrill of the chase and thus have a preference for some
search costs, but the conventional story favors ease of search.
94. See, e.g., INTA Brief, supra note 85, at 23-24, reprinted in 92 TRADEMARK REP. 1139,
1170-71 (2002) (arguing that dilution law protects consumers by helping them conserve their
attention); Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE
L.J. 1687, 1704 n.90 (1999) ("The information consumers can obtain and process is in part a
function of how clear the association between mark and product remains in their minds; 'clutter'
therefore imposes real costs on consumers."); Sheff, supra note 9, at 359, 379 (arguing that
confusion and dilution law both protect against nonrational consumer responses that distort
purchasing decisions); Swann, Dilution Redefined, supra note 9, at 603-04 (arguing that because
consumers' lives are so hectic, they need help from strong, unique signals that simplify messages,
which dilution law protects); Pulos, supra note 54, at 854-58 (accepting the consumer-protection
argument for dilution); cf Long, supra note 8, at 1035 (discussing change in judicial explanations of
dilution towards a consumer focus).
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dilution law benefits only trademark owners, not consumers. 95  Implicitly,
the cognitive theory suggests that courts should enforce dilution law without
searching for narrowing constructions, as they have done in the past when the
law seemed irrational and ill defined. Dilution law can now recognize
trademark owners' claims that ownership extends to portions of consumers'
minds.
96
IV. Critiquing the Cognitive Model of Dilution
Once the harm of dilution is reformulated as an increase in consumer
search costs, it becomes possible to imagine an empirical test for it, although
Judge Posner didn't. 97 This is easy to see as a major advance over previous
concepts of dilution, which generally relied on intuition or ipse dixit.
98
Morrin and Jacoby's experiment showed that lab-induced dilution decreased
respondents' accuracy and response times in identifying senior marks.99 This
seems to be strong evidence that the cognitive model is correct.
The initial question is whether we can reliably extrapolate from lab to
store. In the context of race, Jerry Kang has persuasively argued that
response-time differences of a few hundred milliseconds have powerful
correlates in readily observable, even life-and-death, behavior.100  Still,
reaction times aren't meanings. Unexpected results in studies of concrete
versus abstract words, for example, show that there is a lot we still don't
know about what response times mean and about the relationships between
95. See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 429 ("Unlike traditional infringement law, the prohibitions against
trademark dilution are not the product of common-law development, and are not motivated by an
interest in protecting consumers."); Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir.
2002) ("[D]ilution law protects only the distinctiveness of the mark, which is inherently less
weighty than the dual interest of protecting trademark owners and avoiding harm to consumers that
is at the heart of every trademark claim.").
96. See, e.g., Farley, supra note 38, at 1183 ("It sounds like what is being sought by the
trademark bar is statutorily enforced mind control. Indeed, the International Trademark Association
[1NTA] testified before Congress that the injury in dilution is to the mark's ability to 'hold upon the
public mind."' (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
97. See Ty Inc. v. Sofibelly's, Inc., 353 F.3d 528, 535 (7th Cir. 2003) (opining that it was not
clear "what question could be put to consumers that would elicit a meaningful answer" about
dilution).
98. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 cmt. f (1995) ("Direct
evidence of a dilution of distinctiveness is seldom available because the harm at issue is a blurring
of the mental associations evoked by the mark, a phenomenon not easily sampled by consumer
surveys and not normally manifested by unambiguous consumer behavior."); Jonathan E. Moskin,
Dilution or Delusion: The Rational Limits of Trademark Protection, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 122, 123
(1993) (observing that most cases find dilution without "meaningful empirical proof'); Lynda J.
Oswald, "Tarnishment" and "Blurring" Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 36
AM. Bus. L.J. 255, 283 (1999) (noting that direct evidence of blurring is "typically difficult-
indeed, some commentators would say nigh-well impossible-to obtain" (footnote omitted)).
99. Morrin & Jacoby, supra note 49, at 274.
100. See Kang, supra note 10, at 1525 ("Under threat conditions that police officers face, our
racial schemas incline us to shoot Black men faster."); see also ZALTMAN, supra note 14, at 114-15
(explaining that response latency times better predict behavior than explicitly stated beliefs).
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recall, recognition, and production of words.1 'O In Morrin and Jacoby's
experiment, Dogiva biscuits delayed recognition of Godiva chocolates by 73
milliseconds compared to people who had not seen any other relevant ads
and by 129 milliseconds compared to people who had seen Godiva ads. 10 2
Paper-and-pencil tests of recall, as opposed to recognition, showed less
dilution, but they still showed some effects.'0 3 Yet in the real world, proof
that response delays persist over any appreciable time is limited. 10 4 Nor do
we know at what point a response delay becomes enough to change a pur-
chase decision. The dilution studies find some statistically significant
differences in reactions between groups exposed and unexposed to dilutive
ads, but statistical significance does not mean that practical effects are
substantial. 105
The following sections explore some problems with using the limited
empirical evidence to justify the internal-search-costs model of dilution.
Dilution's supporters have drawn selectively from disparate, loosely related
fields to justify dilution law. Demonstrations of the powerful influence of
context, conflicting evidence about the effects of word frequency on
memory, and research on situations in which dilutive uses might actually
improve recognition all cast doubt on the cognitive model of blurring. Nor
does the available evidence support the cognitive account of tarnishment,
despite its intuitive appeal. Separately, cognitive science suggests extreme
difficulties in measuring actual consumer reactions without distorting them
through the very act of measurement, raising doubts about the surveys used
to identify dilution.
101. Consider the following findings by Kevin Shapiro, who used MRIs to measure response
times for completing sentences. A subject might see one pond, followed by many __ , in which
case the right answer would be ponds. "Surprisingly, the response times for tasks using concrete
words (saying 'many wagons,' after seeing 'one wagon') were actually longer than for tasks using
more abstract words (saying 'many sounds' after seeing 'one sound')-l.8 percent longer with
nouns and 3.8 percent longer with verbs." Elizabeth Gudrais, Neurons Sort Nouns, HARV. MAG.,
July-Aug. 2006, at 15, 16 (discussing Kevin A. Shapiro et al., Cortical Signatures of Noun and
Verb Production, 103 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. 1644 (2006)). This is surprising because longer
response times supposedly indicate greater demands on cognitive processing. Yet there is no
indication that we have more trouble using concrete words than abstract ones in real life, and in fact
people are generally better at recognizing concrete words than abstract words. See Simon Dennis &
Michael S. Humphreys, A Context Noise Model of Episodic Word Recognition, 108 PSYCHOL. REV.
452, 464 (2001) (suggesting that concrete words are more readily recognizable because they appear
in fewer contexts).
102. Morrin & Jacoby, supra note 49, at 269 tbl. 1.
103. Pullig et al., supra note 65, at 61-62.
104. See Klerman, supra note 54, at 1765 (arguing that an increase of 125 milliseconds, as
produced in the Morrin and Jacoby study, is not economically significant). Pullig et al., however,
found statistically significant effects on brand consideration and choice from exposure to dilutive
ads even after a five-day delay. Pullig et al., supra note 65, at 63-64. These results are the most
persuasive of the various academic studies attempting to measure dilution, though they still suffer
from some of the flaws discussed infra.
105. See, e.g., DAVID W. BARNES, STATISTICS AS PROOF: FUNDAMENTALS OF QUANTITATIVE
EVIDENCE 143-44 (1983) (discussing the difference between statistical and practical significance).
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A. Context Effects
In the Perryman case, Judge Posner did not explain why it was a
problem for consumers to have to think harder to figure out the entity to
which Tiffany's refers. 106 In fact, he did not define what it means to think
harder. With blurring, the result of the existence of Tiffany's-the-restaurant
is that we need more context to figure out which Tiffany's someone is talking
about, but we generally have that context.10 7 Product categories, images in
ads, and even distinctive fonts can provide immediate context for a mark.
Preexisting associations reinforce each other so that computer-related mean-
ings of apple are more strongly and effectively activated in an Apple
Computer ad, and fruit-related meanings are activated at the grocery store. 108
When context is king, dilution loses much of its theoretical appeal. 0 9
Consider: Have you ever put your suitcases into a cab in a major U.S. city,
asked for "American" or "United," and received the response "Which
one?" o No rational cab driver would take a person who said "American" to
the local American Apparel or a person who said "United" to the local
United Van Lines. This is so even though American and United are concep-
tually weak, diluted marks. The cab driver experiences no significant search
costs because of his knowledge of the places that people ask cab drivers to
106. See Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating only that the dilution
would cause consumers to "incur as it were a higher imagination cost"); see also Austin, supra note
9, at 891 n.276 (arguing that Posner failed to identify harm from a higher imagination cost, given
that we routinely tolerate the imagination cost of multiple references, such as the numerous
trademark and nontrademark uses of apple despite the famous Apple trademark); id. at 895 (arguing
that consumers may benefit from thinking harder, at least if the thinking is fun). But see Pulos,
supra note 54, at 860 ("[Tlhe imagination costs the consumer encounters toll not only the consumer,
but the market as a whole. Simply put, any amount of time a consumer spends 'thinking harder'
about the meaning of a mark is time she could be spending buying something else or otherwise
contributing to society."). Setting aside Pulos's equation of buying with "contributing to society," it
has yet to be established that people are otherwise inert while they process information. Often
enough, they may continue walking down store aisles or engaging in other activity. Or they may be
sitting watching television, in which case their attention may be diverted from the next ad while
they are struggling to process the preceding ad. Whether this represents social loss is hard to say.
107. See Roger W. Shuy, Linguistic Thoughts on Trademark Dilution 5-6 (2003) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Texas Law Review).
108. See Ren6 Zeelenberg et al., Semantic Context Effects and Priming in Word Association, 10
PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REv. 653, 653, 656 (2003) (finding that when semantically ambiguous
words were disambiguated with context, such as organ with music, the words were far less likely to
subsequently cue inconsistent meanings, such as organ with body part). This complicates the
cognitive model's claim that phonological similarities between marks lead to interference with the
meaning of both marks.
109. In fact, some psychologists argue that the basic spreading-activation model on which the
cognitive theory of dilution is based misconceives how memory is actually constructed in the mind;
current context determines which past experiences will be recalled and deemed relevant. E.g.,
Antonia Kronlund et al., Consumer Memory, Fluency, and Familiarity, in THE HANDBOOK OF
CONSUMER PSYCHOLOGY (Curtis P. Haugtvedt et al. eds., forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 26-37,
on file with the Texas Law Review).
110. You might be asked "LaGuardia or JFK?"-another question that depends on your
understanding the referent. You are not being asked for political or historical opinions.
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go. "Words in isolation seldom occur in our lives, except in spelling bees
and grocery lists. Since humans commonly use context to disambiguate and
figure out what is meant, it is reasonable to expect them to keep on doing this
with trademarks."'
Product categories provide an important type of context. Robert
Peterson and his confederates surveyed major product categories and
trademarks, examining typicality (the extent to which naming a brand caused
a respondent to produce its major product category, as McDonald's would
produce "fast food") and dominance (the extent to which naming a product
category caused a respondent to produce a brand as the first that came to
mind). 112  Leading brands' typicality was much greater than their
dominance-on average three times greater.' 3  In other words, marks are
easy to recognize as category members without being at the top of a
respondent's mind in the category." 4  Moreover, the differences between
recognition when prompted with a brand and recognition when prompted
with a category may have significant real-world effects. Even if the
Heineken name in the abstract produces less association with beer because of
Heineken popcorn, consumers may still identify it as a beer if they are
prompted with the category, and when they go to the store to buy beer, it will
be right there on the shelf."15 "It is hard to think of situations where con-
sumer search is aided by the ability to remember the product category
associated with a brand. Consumers just do not confront trademarks in the
abstract very often .... They certainly do not encounter many tombstone
11. Shuy, supra note 107, at 6. Shuy does think dilution might be possible in context-free
environments. See id.; see also Simonson, supra note 72, at 156 (observing that after the addition
of Sony bleach to the marketplace, "[t]he issue is whether, at the time of exposure to the brand
name, there is sufficient cuing whereby the individual would know perceptually to which of the two
Sony products the word Sony is referring"); Jerre B. Swann, Sr., Dilution Redefined for the Year
2000, 37 HoUs. L. REV. 729, 759 (2000) ("Dilution is... the difference between a brand with a
meaning substantially in the abstract, and a brand with a substantial meaning only in context or after
cueing.").
112. See Peterson et al., supra note 54, at 259-63.
113. See id. at 261. Half of the brands with typicality over 90% showed low levels of
dominance. See id. at 262.
114. Cf Joan Meyers-Levy, The Influence of a Brand Name's Association Set Size and Word
Frequency on Brand Memory, 16 J. CONSUMER RES. 197, 202-03 (1989) (finding that association-
set size has little effect on recognition tasks, as compared to recall).
115. See Klerman, supra note 54, at 1765-66; see also Dennis & Humphreys, supra note 101,
at 463 (finding that recall and recognition differ in the effects of time and interference by other
words and that recognition persists when recall fails).
116. Klerman, supra note 54, at 1765; see also Daniel J. Howard et al., The Effects of Brand
Name Similarity on Brand Source Confusion: Implications for Trademark Infringement, 19 J. PUB.
POL'Y & MARKETING 250, 261 (2000) (finding that in situations of high involvement, as when a
purchase actually turns on a decision, consumers process more brand-related information than when
they are just looking at ads).
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ads focused on product information without images or logos, which was the
form used in the Morrin and Jacoby study." 17
Anecdotal evidence from the market further indicates that marks can be
strong without being unique. Steve Hartman examined twenty-one trade-
marks that were the leading brands in their product categories in 1925,
nineteen of which were also leading in 1985 (the other two were in second
place)." 8  All but four had nontrademark meanings, including Swift, Life
Savers, Ivory, and a variety of personal names. 1 9 In the abstract, these
marks "are bound to be associated with or call to mind things other than the




Why, then, did laboratory studies reveal an apparent dilutive effect from
a single exposure to Dogiva biscuits and Heineken popcorn? One possibility
is that the test environment was itself decontextualizing, depriving subjects
of the cues they would ordinarily use to distinguish a dilutive use from a
senior mark. Morrin and Jacoby told their test subjects, students who were
taking marketing courses, that they would be tested on the information pro-
vided in the ads, 122 which themselves were not the image- and emotion-laden
appeals to which consumers are generally subjected. This method made it
likely that subjects would focus on information, not on the contextual,
emotional associations that serve to distinguish brands in the real world.
123
Another sign that the Morrin and Jacoby study was somewhat unusual comes
from the prominent disclaimers used to ensure that they could test dilution,
117. Morrin and her colleagues subsequently tested the effects of logos but still did not present
actual ads; they measured dilution by prompting study participants with brand names, without any
product or category information. See Morrin et al., supra note 87, at 251-52.
118. Steve Hartman, Brand Equity Impairment-The Meaning of Dilution, 87 TRADEMARK
REP. 418, 429-30 (1997).
119. Id. at 429.
120. Id.
121. Id. at430.
122. Morrin & Jacoby, supra note 49, at 268-69.
123. See id. at 269, 275 (describing and giving examples of the ads presented in the study). The
Pullig et al. studies, which otherwise substantially improved on the Morrin and Jacoby studies, also
used very stark ads, containing only a brand name, a product category, and two claims (along with a
prominent disclaimer for the dilution test ads). See Pullig et al., supra note 65, at 57 ("We told
participants that the advertisements were depicted in this simple fashion because we were interested
in their reactions to the informational content of the advertisements." (emphasis added)). Likewise,
Simonson tested reactions to a typed list of product names and categories without further
description of the new products. See Simonson, supra note 87, app. c at 120-21, app. d at 122-27
(reproducing the list of new brands and questions presented to respondents in Simonson's study).
Context, imagery, and other cues were missing. Simonson's questions asked respondents how they
would feel about the original brand after learning of a new, unrelated product using the same name.
See id. app. d at 124-25. He acknowledged that the testing context, including immediate contrast
with the original brand and lack of price and quality information, limited the validity of his results.
See id. at 87-88 (detailing the limitations of the methodology).
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rather than confusion. 124 No test subject had difficulty identifying the source
of the products. 125 While prominent disclaimers may work as part of tomb-
stone ads, other studies show that disclaimers rarely work so well in naturally
occurring ads. 26 The very success of the disclaimers indicates an unusual
type of processing compared to information processing in more natural mar-
ket settings.
B. Association Sets and Uncommon Words
The previous subpart focused on the gaps between laboratory studies
and real-world experiences of trademarks. But what about the underlying
experimental and theoretical bases for the cognitive account of dilution?
This subpart addresses some basic components of that account, dealing with
how the mind processes common and uncommon words and meanings.
Jerre Swann, a well-known trademark practitioner and former editor of
The Trademark Reporter, has been a major proponent of using cognitive
theories to justify and define dilution. He cites psychological studies to show
that adding unrelated associations to a famous mark causes dilution and inter-
feres with consumers' ability to retrieve the mark because:
"'[R]are words [like "Kodak"] are more distinctively encoded than
(are) common words,"' and words that have a limited number of
"association set[s]" (e.g., "Cheer" for an encouraging shout and an all-
temperature detergent), can likewise be readily retrieved....
"Some empirical research has shown[, on the other hand,] that the
greater the number of associations a word has (the less distinctive it
is)[,] the more difficult it is for the individual initially to encode the
word in memory or later to recall the word."' 127
124. See Morrin & Jacoby, supra note 49, at 275 (indicating that the study's stimuli included
language such as "Note: Heineken popcorn is NOT associated with the makers of Heineken beer").
125. Id. at 268-69; see also Pullig et al., supra note 65, at 57-58, 63-64 (finding that only very
small percentages of respondents, from 1.2% to 3.6%, failed to report the disclaimers); Simonson,
supra note 87, at 125 (using a detailed disclaimer that "[e]ach of the products... bears no relation
to any know[n] products that you may be familiar with. As an example, if you see below
'Mercedes-Benz CD player,' it has NO relation to the familiar Mercedes-Benz automobiles other
than name. These types of situations do arise. Some examples you may be familiar with are Ritz
crackers and Ritz hotels...").
126. See, e.g., Jacob Jacoby & Robert Lloyd Raskopf, Disclaimers in Trademark Infringement
Litigation: More Trouble than They Are Worth?, 76 TRADEMARK REP. 35, 36, 54-58 (1986)
(arguing that lack of exposure, information loss, and comprehension failure render disclaimers
ineffective); Gita Venkataramani Johar & Carolyn J. Simmons, The Use of Concurrent Disclosures
to Correct Invalid Inferences, 26 J. CONSUMER RES. 307, 320 (2000) (arguing that because of
cognitive-processing limitations, "obviously effective disclosures (e.g., those that are encoded,
those that are explicit, etc.) are often ineffective"); Mitchell E. Radin, Disclaimers as a Remedy for
Trademark Infringement: Inadequacies and Alternatives, 76 TRADEMARK REP. 59, 61-67 (1986)
(discussing failures of disclaimers in actual market conditions).
127. Swann, supra note 111, at 755 (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting
Meyers-Levy, supra note 114, at 198 and Moskin, supra note 98, at 136). All of those quotation
marks are there for a reason-Swann is extrapolating from a study that itself extrapolates from
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Swann's citation to the work of Joan Meyers-Levy supposedly shows
that increasing the association-set size of a brand decreases the consumer's
ability to retrieve brand-relevant information. 128  There are at least three
problems with this extrapolation. First, the underlying research uses a
definition of "association set" that may not be intuitive to lawyers. Associa-
tion set is defined as the number of words that are named by at least two
people when a large number are asked the first word that comes to mind in
response to a target word. 2 9 Unless a dilutive use was the first thing that
came to mind, it would not affect this measure of association. Second and
relatedly, even if a dilutive use dominated some respondents' minds, it would
only increase the set size by one. The underlying research does not come
close to identifying any effect from an increase of one association. Third,
Meyers-Levy does not measure change, though Swann applies her work to
change over time; her research, like that of others in the field, compares
words with existing high- and low-measured frequency and association-set
sizes. 13
0
Still, assuming those problems away, the Meyers-Levy research may
have implications for famous brands. High-frequency words are easy to
process, and thus we do not encode them distinctively, meaning that we do
not pay much attention to them.' 31 If they are used as brand names, we will
have trouble remembering the brand. Low-frequency words are relatively
difficult to encode, and thus we process them more meaningfully. 32 Given
that advertisers have trouble getting consumers to pay attention to advertising
in general, as Part I suggests, low-frequency words seem more desirable as
marks. Meyers-Levy offers ivory as an example of a low-frequency word
nontrademarks to trademarks. Kodak and Cheer are his additions, and they are problematic,
illustrating the difficulty of transferring basic research to substantive legal conclusions. For Kodak,
"distinctively encoded" is not the same as famous, though it does resemble the legal concept of
fanciful marks, which are coined words that are unique to the brand. Uniqueness itself is not
necessarily an aid to memory. Consider some fanciful drug names: Xalatan, Cerebyx, Symbyax.
Unless you know more about them, their phonological uniqueness has little meaning and in fact
may make them forgettable. For Cheer, Swann has skipped a number of related meanings. The
noun alone can mean lightness of spirits, a source ofjoy, a shout of approval, a rehearsed phrase or
jingle shouted in unison, and festive food and drink (not to mention the "Bronx cheer"), and the
verb has both transitive and intransitive forms. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 317 (4th ed. 2000). In any event, the number of dictionary definitions is not
the same as the association-set size-a technical term. See infra notes 128-30 and accompanying
text. I belabor the point because we have no particular idea how many associations it takes to give a
word a "large" or "small" set, especially when we are comparing nontrademark apples to trademark
Orangina.
128. See Meyers-Levy, supra note 114, at 205.
129. See Douglas L. Nelson et al., Interpreting the Influence of Implicitly Activated Memories
on Recall and Recognition, 105 PSYCHOL. REv. 299, 300 (1998).
130. See Meyers-Levy, supra note 114, at 201-04.
131. Id. at 198.
132. See id. There is already a bit of a conflict here with the idea that trademarks exist to make
things easy for consumers.
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that therefore relates strongly to soap. 133 When a word is low frequency, a
particular use will cause people to encode only relevant information pre-
sented in context because their attention will be drawn to specific attributes
of the word (for ivory, color and not elephants). 134  Thus, with a low-
frequency word, even a large association-set size will not interfere with
memory. 3 5  "Indeed, it is possible that memory might be somewhat en-
hanced as the size of the association set increases [for low-frequency words]
because more associations will be available to relate meaningfully to the
brand name in a distinctive manner."' 36  By contrast, Swann's reasoning is
that a use that takes a mark from low to high frequency or increases the asso-
ciations of a high-frequency mark creates a branding problem by making the
mark harder to recognize. 1
37
Meyers-Levy experimented with fictitious antiperspirants, blemish
medications, and disposable razors, choosing brand names from words with
known frequencies and association-set sizes.138 Low-frequency words
(fifteen or fewer uses per million words) were crisp, moose, bribe, cork,
shove, and dusk.13 9 High-frequency words (one hundred or more per million)
were yard, lake, room, cloud, day, and round.140 One might wonder about
the selling power of Yard antiperspirant, Cloud blemish medication, and
Round razors, but a more important thing to note is that low-frequency words
are still quite recognizable.
Experimental subjects heard ads for products, which they were told
were existing regional brands, and were instructed to consider how clear,
grammatical, and professionally written the ads were.141 Next, they were
asked to recall and write down all statements they could remember from the
ads. 142 Then, they were shown lists of brand names, instructed that some
might be "impostors," and asked to indicate whether they recognized the
brands. 143 The results showed that for high-frequency brand names, recall
was poorer (both immediately and at twenty-four hours) for words with a
133. Id. at 198-99.
134. See id. at 199 ("[E]ncoding of concepts in the association set is restricted to only those
items that meaningfully yet distinctively relate the word with other relevant information presented
in the context." (citation omitted)).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Swann, supra note 111, at 755.
138. Meyers-Levy, supra note 114, at 200.
139. See id. at 201 (noting that crisp, moose, and bribe have large set sizes, and cork, shove,
and dusk have small set sizes).
140. See id. (noting that yard, lake, and room have large set sizes, and cloud, day, and round
have small set sizes).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 201-02.
143. Id. at 202.
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large association-set size. 144  With low-frequency brand names, recall was
similar regardless of set size.
45
That sounds like good reason for marketers to minimize the associations
evoked by their famous brands. The flaw is the assumption that famous
brand names are high frequency or can be made so by dilution. 146  In the
British National Corpus, assembled from large samples of spoken and written
English, only 7,726 words occur at least ten times per million (which would
be one use in a 300-page book). 147  In the 2003 release of the American
National Corpus, which is a similar endeavor, only one of the top forty
brands in BusinessWeek's Best Global Brands 2006148 had frequencies ap-
proaching one hundred per million words,149 and that one, Microsoft, appears
to be an artifact.' 50 Kodak-Swann's example of a famous mark subject to
144. Id. at 202, 205.
145. Id.
146. Using invented brands with common nouns may have distorted the results in other ways.
Like proper names, recognized brands are processed differently in the brain than ordinary nouns,
though the ultimate implications of that finding are unclear. See Possidonia F.D. Gontijo et al.,
How Brand Names Are Special: Brands, Words, and Hemispheres, 82 BRAIN & LANGUAGE 327,
327 (2002) (finding processing of brand names to be less lateralized within the brain than that of
common nouns).
147. See Global English, http://www.audiencedialogue.net/english.html (citing GEOFFREY
LEECH ET AL., WORD FREQUENCIES IN WRITTEN AND SPOKEN ENGLISH (2001)); see also British
National Corpus, http://www.natcorp.ox.ac.uk (providing a searchable collection of written and
spoken language). Mark Lemley suggested to me that word frequency in advertising contexts will
likely be different from frequency in other areas. I have found no evidence on this one way or
another, and I have no reason to think that frequency-mediated processing of words differs in
relevant ways depending on whether or not the words appear in an ad. Of course, identifying a text
as an ad affects the level of attention a consumer is likely to give to it, but there is no indication that
this invalidates accepted frequency measures.
148. INTERBRAND & BUSNESSWEEK, BEST GLOBAL BRANDS 2006: A RANKING BY BRAND
VALUE 11-12 (2006), available at http://www.ourfishbowl.com/images/surveys/BGB06Report-
072706.pdf.
149. The American National Corpus (ANC) is not a random sample, but it is the best available
corpus for American English. The second release of the ANC contains 22,393,704 words by one
measure (one could also use a higher number). See American National Corpus, Second Release
Contents, http://americannationalcorpus.org/SecondRelease/contents.html. To get rough estimates
of frequency per million, I divided the number of instances of a word in the second release by
22.39. In some cases, I aggregated variants (467 coke, 11 cokes, 7 coca-cola), but given the
numbers at issue, it did not make a difference. Aside from microsoft, by far the highest frequency
terms in the top forty brands were ford/fords (roughly 44 uses per million words), apple/apples (37
per million), and disney/disneyland/disneyworld (38 per million), the first two of which plainly
include some nonmark uses, such as personal names and generic words. Among the remaining top
forty brands with measurable frequencies, the average frequency was about 7 per million. (I did not
measure a few multiword brands, such as Goldman Sachs.)
150. Depending on how one counts the number of words in the second release, Microsoft's
frequency is between 78 and 91 per million. The ANC contains a large number of articles from the
Microsoft-owned online magazine Slate and the Biomed database; in the latter case, most instances
of Microsoft appear to be indications that a table was prepared using Microsoft Excel. Without the
Slate articles (but including Biomed), Microsoft's frequency in the written portion of the ANC is
slightly over 14 per million words. Email from Keith Suderman, Research Associate, American
National Corpus, to Rebecca Tushnet, Professor, Georgetown University Law Center (Nov. 1, 2006,
11:06 EST) (on file with the Texas Law Review) (using data from the second release of the ANC).
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dilution-had a frequency of approximately seven per million, Hyatt and
Godiva were slightly above one, and Heineken was below one. Thus, even
dilutive uses that doubled the frequency of exposure to these marks would
still leave them as low frequency. There just aren't that many high-
frequency words. 151
The one study I have found that specifically addressed trademarks and
frequency effects found that popular brands were recognized with a speed
and accuracy similar to that of low-frequency words. 52  Meyers-Levy's
findings, then, in fact suggest that dilution does not harm many famous
trademarks because adding associations to low-frequency words does not
interfere with retrieval or recognition-and may even help.' 
53
C. Reaffirmation Effects
As suggested briefly in the previous subpart, there are reasons to think
that at least some dilutive uses can reinforce, rather than chip away at, the
strength of a mark. Any delay in recognizing which Tiffany's or which
Apple a particular use refers to may be compensated for by easier recall of
the marks.
151. Sheff, another dilution proponent, makes the same mistake as Swann in discussing word-
frequency research. See Sheff, supra note 9, at 363 ("Studies have found that low-frequency
words-those uncommon in ordinary usage-are more easily recognized when encountered after an
initial exposure than are high-frequency words.... Thus, one reason the law may be more
protective of unique marks is that-absent any other measure of consumer reaction to a
trademark-such marks, once encountered, may more likely be recognized than non-unique
marks .... "). Sheffconflates low-frequency words (like crisp, moose, bribe, cork, shove, and dusk,
see Meyers-Levy, supra note 114, at 201) with uncommon words (which crisp et al. surely are not
in the lay understanding Sheff invokes), then further conflates low frequency with uniqueness, even
though uniqueness is determined by the extent to which a term refers to only one thing rather than
by the number of times people use it to mean that thing.
152. See Antonia Kronlund, Remembering Words and Brand Names After a Perception of
Discrepancy 59-60 (Spring 2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Simon Fraser University),
available at http://ir.lib.sfu.ca/handle/1892/2658 (testing brands including Camel and Marlboro for
cigarettes, Levis and Wrangler for jeans, Coke and Pepsi for soda, and Tide and Sunlight for
detergent); see also Gontijo et al., supra note 146, at 331, 335 (finding that familiar brand names
were recognized more slowly and less accurately than common nouns with frequencies of 100-160
per million and that capitalization increased speed of recognition); Antonia Kronlund & Bruce W.A.
Whittlesea, Remembering Words and Brands After a Perception of Discrepancy 30 (Nov. 20, 2006)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Texas Law Review) (finding that brand names are
recognized through recollection, like low-frequency words).
153. In the end, association-set size may simply not be all that important in real-world settings.
Other studies suggest that context moderates any effect of association-set size. See Nelson et al.,
supra note 129, at 301 ("When targets are presented within a second or so of key context words
during the study trial, [target set size] effects are nearly eliminated."). A switch in attention to
another task for a few minutes does the same, meaning that exposure to diluting marks as part of the
various activities of daily life, instead of in time-limited lab studies, might not cause the posited
effects. See id. at 301-02, 308 (observing that several minutes spent multiplying numbers can
eliminate target-set-size effects).
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In essence, exposure to near variants or uses in other contexts makes the
trademark more familiar and thus more easily retrieved from memory.
154
This process can add value in the same way that marketers think preexisting
associations carried by descriptive or suggestive terms add value to a
trademark. Words with multiple associations may be more easily activated,
or reference to one word may "prime" us to recall a similar word.155
Tiffany's-the-restaurant may make us think of Tiffany's-the-jeweler when
we are at lunch thinking of gifts for Mother's Day. 156 In one experiment that
154. Familiarity increases likability, among other things. See Sheff, supra note 9, at 365
(stating that research shows that increased exposure leads to increased preference for a stimulus);
sources cited supra note 27; cf Laura R. Bradford, Parody and Perception: Using Cognitive
Research to Expand Fair Use in Copyright, 46 B.C. L. REv. 705, 743, 743-44 (2005) ("During
initial introduction to a brand or message, frequency of exposure increases familiarity and
likeability."). Bradford points to research indicating that oversaturation eventually reverses the
likability effect, as people get annoyed by the millionth repetition of an ad. See id. at 743-44.
Trademark owners may deal with this effect by changing their ad campaigns. People get fed up
with repetitive scripts, but they do not get tired of Coke in the same way. See Hayden Noel, The
Spacing Effect: Enhancing Memory for Repeated Marketing Stimuli, 16 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL.
306, 307-08 (2006) ("[T]he encoding variability hypothesis states that the more variable the first
and second presentations of a stimulus, the more paths there are to retrieval at test, and so the more
likely it is that the stimulus will be recalled. For example .... people had better recall of a brand
name after seeing two ads for the same brand than after viewing two repetitions of the same ad."
(citation omitted)); Rik Pieters et al., Breaking Through the Clutter: Benefits of Advertisement
Originality and Familiarity for Brand Attention and Memory, 48 MGMT. SCI. 765, 765 (2002)
(finding that the best advertisements combined familiarity and originality). The source of backlash,
as Bradford notes, is "unvaried" exposure. Bradford, supra, at 744. Variety is the spice of
advertising, and dilutive uses are likely to provide variety.
155. See Meyers-Levy, supra note 114, at 197 (noting that American is a memorable brand for
airlines because of the diverse meaningful concepts already associated with it). Priming generally
helps recall and production. That is, if people see a target word, then later are given related words
as cues and asked to say the first word that comes to mind, they are more likely to respond with the
target than if they have not been initially primed with the target. See H. Shanker Krishnan &
Dipankar Chakravarti, Memory Measures for Pretesting Advertisements: An Integrative Conceptual
Framework and a Diagnostic Template, 8 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 1, 7 (1999) (finding that priming
works with both semantic and phonological cues like word fragments); Douglas L. Nelson &
Leilani B. Goodmon, Experiencing a Word Can Prime Its Accessibility and Its Associative
Connections to Related Words, 30 MEMORY & COGNITION 380, 380 (2002) (noting that priming
has been observed under a wide variety of conditions involving free association); Ren6 Zeelenberg
et al., Priming in a Free Association Task as a Function of Association Directionality, 27 MEMORY
& COGNITION 956, 959 (1999) (observing that priming in free association was dependent on the
existence of an association between a target and a cue). Priming also works with features like
colors and pictures. See Johar et al., supra note 27, at 143 (noting that background pictures and
colors on a Web page prime product choice, though consumers are not aware of this).
Priming effects are greater for low-frequency words (like trademarks), for words with smaller
sets of associates, and for words whose associates are also associated with each other, so that there
are dense interconnections. Nelson & Goodmon, supra, at 391. Some of this is consistent with the
cognitive theory of dilution, but it is notable that priming effects exist even when association sets
are large and thinly connected--even, that is, under conditions approximating dilution.
156. See Hartman, supra note 118, at 424 (observing that the second use of a mark in a different
product class may serve as a reminder of the first mark); Maureen Morrin, The Impact of Brand
Extensions on Parent Brand Memory Structures and Retrieval Processes, 36 J. MARKETING RES.
517, 518 (1999) (finding that brand extensions can improve retrieval of the core brand); Chris
Brown, Comment, A Dilution Delusion: The Unjustifiable Protection of Similar Marks, 72 U. CIN.
2008)
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was supposed to provide evidence for the cognitive model of tarnishment,
exposure to ads for a Hyatt tattoo parlor actually increased the value subjects
placed on the Hyatt name in choosing hotels. 57  (An important caveat,
however, is that priming effects, like dilution effects, are typically small and
could be unimportant to famous marks. 158)
Beyond priming, dilutive uses may increase the richness of a term's
associations. Multiplication of associations can aid recall of trademarks
comprising uncommon words. 5 9 The cognitive model of dilution posits that
consumers do not like to think hard. If it is effortful to distinguish one
Tiffany's from another, they will tune out and think less of both. But
sometimes consumers like to think-we like mystery, incongruity. The uni-
form model that says thinking is hard not only denigrates consumers, it
misdescribes us.' 60  Recall that low-frequency words are remembered better
L. REV. 1023, 1038 (2004) ("Arguably, use of a similar brand name could actually benefit the
original brand by activating the memory of the original brand in a viewer's working memory."); cf
Pullig et al., supra note 65, at 60-61 (finding reinforcement and faster recognition times for the
original brand after exposure to an identical, unrelated brand with similar product attributes or in a
similar category, though finding inhibition when product attributes and categories were substantially
different). If consumers are not paying much attention, they are likely to be primed by superficial
resemblances. See, e.g., Chris Janiszewski, Preattentive Mere Exposure Effects, 20 J. CONSUMER
RES. 376, 376 (1993) (suggesting that incidental exposure to logos, brand names, or pictures of
objects may lead to more favorable product evaluations even when consumers do not notice the
initial presentation); Dominika Maison et al., Predictive Validity of the Implicit Association Test in
Studies of Brands, Consumer Attitudes, and Behavior, 14 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 405, 405 (2004)
(reviewing previous findings that exposure to ads influences brand attitudes even when consumers
have no memory of the exposure and even when they are explicitly trying to avoid the products
depicted in the ads).
157. See Joel H. Steckel et al., Dilution Through the Looking Glass: A Marketing Look at the
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005, 96 TRADEMARK REP. 616, 635 (2006). Steckel et al.
explain their "surprising" results as follows: "People who hold strong opinions are likely to examine
inconsistent information in a biased manner. The salience of the inconsistency leads them to
counterargue the inconsistent information. This leads to the original opinion being even more
strongly held than before the information was presented." Id. They argue, however, that because
the cognitive model of dilution is true, it must be the case that repeated exposures to the Hyatt tattoo
parlor would have had the opposite effect. See id. ("Only upon repetition, can the salience of the
allegedly diluting stimulus potentially subside and the corresponding counterarguing cease. The
gradual whittling away process can begin since the stimulus now travels under the radar.").
158. See Zeelenberg et al., supra note 108, at 657 (citing studies indicating that priming
typically increases the probability of producing a primed word by 5-/o-10% over baseline); see also
Nelson & Goodmon, supra note 155, at 393-94 (observing that words that are most likely to come
to mind in response to cues show limited priming because the baseline probability that they will be
produced without priming is already so high).
159. See generally Nelson & Goodmon, supra note 155 (reporting the results of experiments
showing greater priming effects for low-frequency words, as compared to high-frequency words,
due at least in part to increases in activation).
160. See, e.g., Russell H. Fazio et al., On the Development and Strength of Category-Brand
Associations in Memory: The Case of Mystery Ads, 1 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 1, 10 (1992) ("[Our]
findings are consistent with a growing literature that implicates cognitive effort in advertising
effectiveness.... [Other research] found self-generated conclusions from print ads were more
accessible (and persuasive) than identical conclusions stated explicitly in the ad."). See generally
HENRY JENKINS, CONVERGENCE CULTURE: WHERE OLD AND NEW MEDIA COLLIDE (2006)
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because they require more processing to encode in memory-an instance of
"thinking hard" that is useful to trademark owners. In essence, there may be
a tradeoff between ease and richness of processing. Some difficulty in re-
trieval prompts more mental processing, which itself leads to better long-
term memory for the relevant concepts.1 61 The delayed response times that
Morrin and Jacoby saw as evidence of dilution when they tested subjects
with a single recognition test could have improved the strength of the diluted
marks in the long run. 162
Creative use of language, which is involved in many dilution cases, may
be especially reinforcing, as courts have hinted at when finding humorous
uses nondiluting. 163 Although people don't like information overload, we do
(discussing the powerful emotional and often financial investments fans make in their favorite
products, spending hours investigating and discussing details).
161. See, e.g., Mark R. Forehand & Kevin Lane Keller, Initial Retrieval Difficulty and
Subsequent Recall in an Advertising Setting, 5 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 299, 318-19 (1996)
(finding that ads that are initially very easy to remember do not trigger extensive processing and are
harder to remember in the long run); Noel, supra note 154, at 308 (discussing mental
reconstruction's positive effects on long-term memory); Henrik Sjodin & Fredrik Tom, When
Communication Challenges Brand Associations: A Framework for Understanding Consumer
Responses to Brand Image Incongruity, 5 J. CONSUMER BEHAV. 32, 38 (2006) ("Incongruity can be
seen as challenging and interesting in the context of well-known brands that often may suffer from
boredom.... [A] challenging ad will cause cognitive elaboration and thoughts about how the ad
fits with the established brand image. This elaboration may increase the salience of the brand in
memory, which in turn would lead to enhanced brand attitude." (citations omitted)); Kronlund,
supra note 152, at 19-20, 23 (finding that perceptions of discrepancy resolved by more information
identifying a brand enhance later recognition of the brand). In a more unusual illustration of the
trade-off between ease of processing and ultimate accessibility of information, researchers found
that using an untrustworthy spokesperson caused consumers to remember ad claims faster than
using a trustworthy spokesperson, apparently because the untrustworthy spokesperson triggered
more evaluation of the message. The attitudes toward the ad claims were just as positive for both
sets of spokespeople, but the untrustworthy spokesperson created stronger and more accessible
attitudes. See Joseph R. Priester & Richard E. Petty, The Influence of Spokesperson
Trustworthiness on Message Elaboration, Attitude Strength, and Advertising Effectiveness, 13 J.
CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 408 (2003).
162. As Forehand and Keller found:
[Tihe more time a participant needed to successfully retrieve an item at an initial trial,
the more likely it was that the item would be recalled at a later trial.... [D]ifficult
retrieval attempts provide an opportunity for a second encoding of the to-be-recalled
information.... By increasing overall retrieval effort and intensity, this second
encoding should strengthen the existing retrieval routes to the item and therefore
increase the probability of recall at delay .... [D]ifficult initial retrievals also increase
the probability that unusual retrieval routes will be used and reinforced.
Forehand & Keller, supra note 161, at 304.
163. See Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1489, 1489-90 (10th Cir.
1987) ("[P]arody tends to increase public identification of a plaintiff's mark with the plaintiff."
(quoting Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 625 F. Supp. 48, 57 (D.N.M. 1985)); see also
Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc. 73 F.3d 497, 506 (2d Cir. 1996) (adopting the
reasoning in Jordache); Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs, LLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410,
422 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (same) ("[T]he joke itself reinforces the public's association of the mark with
the plaintiff." (alteration in original) (quoting Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech:
Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982
Wis. L. REv. 158, 189)); Yankee Publ'g Inc. v. News Am. Publ'g Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267, 282
2008]
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very much like to play with language. Mental elaboration of a word, for
example, generating rhymes for that word, improves memory by increasing
the subject's involvement in processing and by providing redundant paths for
retrieval of the initial word.' 64 As one commentator argues, "[T]he mental
processing involved in interpreting the nature of the pun on Federal Express
incorporated in the name Federal Expresso could actually do more to assist a
person's future recall of Federal Express than just seeing a sign with the
brand on it."
165
By adding branches to a trademark's mental tree, multiple associations
make it bigger, which improves availability in a well-forested mind. But,
dilution proponents will respond, the associations of a famous mark are
controlled by a single source-the tree is carefully pruned. In fact, no owner
can control a mark in this way. There is nothing (as yet) that Coca-Cola can
do to erase my memory of the time I spilled a Diet Coke into my keyboard.
166
In a trademark case involving the world-striding brand McDonald's, twenty
percent of survey respondents associated Mc with negative concepts.
167
Multiple associations inevitably escape trademark owners' control.
Nonetheless, reaffirmation effects might strengthen concerns about tarnish-
ment if we believe that reminding consumers of a famous brand can also
change the emotional resonance of the brand.
Sometimes new associations do not reinforce the original concept, but
that's no help for the theories of blurring and tarnishment. Associations can
be one-way: people prompted with the word bone often respond with dog,
but the prompt dog never produces the response bone-perhaps because
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("[T]he use of famous marks in parodies causes no loss of distinctiveness, since
the success of the use depends upon the continued association of the mark with the plaintiff."
(quoting Denicola, supra, at 188)).
164. See Brown, supra note 156, at 1038 ("'[E]laboration' is a tool used to enhance memory by
having the subject elaborate on, or build on, the information to be remembered. Elaboration can
take different forms. 'Nonmeaningful elaboration,' such as generating rhymes for each word on a
list to be memorized or even reading sentences upside-down, has been found to improve memory by
requiring more elaborate processing from the subject." (footnote omitted) (quoting ANDERSON,
supra note 46, at 167, 173)). Other studies show that a rhyme, such as picktick, can facilitate word
recognition and distinction. See Sevald & Dell, supra note 47, at 110. Rhyming words also
produce better performance on short-term-memory tasks compared to phonologically similar but
nonrhyming words. See Anthony B. Fallon et al., Phonological Similarity and Trace Degradation
in the Serial Recall Task: When CAT Helps RAT, But Not MAN, 34 INT'L J. PSYCHOL. 301, 301
(1999).
165. Brown, supra note 156, at 1038-39.
166. Clever proponents of dilution theories slide between the individual and the group when
discussing brands as shortcuts that only work if their images remain consistent. A trademark can
have a consistent meaning to one individual that differs from its consistent meaning to another.
Easy examples come from brands popular with parents that are therefore unpopular with their
children and from the rise of "my" brands like MySpace, which offer a personalized experience for
each user.
167. See ROGER SHuY, LINGUISTIC BATTLES IN TRADEMARK DISPUTES 102-04 (2002)
(describing the results of consumer surveys carried out by McDonald's for use at trial in Quality
Inns International, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198 (D. Md. 1988)).
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bone is just very far down the list of terms associated with dog. Because the
association is unidirectional, even people who have been primed with bone
do not use it as a response to the cue dog.168 If this result occurs with trade-
marks as well, Dogiva dog biscuits could routinely trigger an association
with Godiva, but those who see a Godiva box would not think of dog
biscuits. Blurring and even tarnishment would be avoided even though there
would be free riding on the mark.
Priming and other association effects result from the fact that our
information environment is always changing. What has gone before can
always be revised by what comes next. If that were not so, dilution would
not be a concern because later exposure to a dilutive use could never shake
the hold of a famous mark. But by the same token, repeated exposure to
Starbucks, which will occur whether or not a competing coffee store offers a
"Charbucks" blend, can reinforce the original against any threat.' 69 Indeed,
in the dilution experiments, certain well-known brands resist dilution entirely
even without reminder ads. iv° Fame may preserve the unidirectionality of
168. See Zeelenberg et al., supra note 155, at 957.
169. See Hall, supra note 15, at 25 ("Many, possibly most, target audiences, including the
heavy-category users who are critical to the success of most established brands, will be exposed to
the advertising in a continuous loop between post-experience and pre-experience, depending on
purchase cycles and personal behavior.... [T]he advertising will act both to organize memory of
the last usage/purchase experience and to frame perception of the next experience."). Although the
Morrin and Jacoby study never exposed participants to ads for both the senior and junior user, it is
notable that the Godiva ad increased response time and increased recognition accuracy by over 20%
compared to the no-relevant-ad control, whereas Dogiva decreased accuracy by only 5%. Morrin &
Jacoby, supra note 49, at 269 tbl. 1. (For Heineken and Hyatt, exposure to reinforcing ads actually
decreased accuracy compared to no exposure, but not by much. Id.)
170. See Morrin & Jacoby, supra note 49, at 272, 269, 272 (explaining that Hyatt did not
appear to have been harmed by exposure to certain trademark-diluting advertisements and noting
that "some brands, such as Continental Airlines, are so familiar to consumers ... that recall of their
original product category is largely immune to trademark dilution"); Peterson et al., supra note 54,
at 266 (discussing the continued strength of Mead Data's Lexis mark despite Toyota's Lexus);
Simonson, supra note 72, at 163 (explaining that the more dominant a brand is, the less easily
consumers learn new associations); cf Terence A. Shimp et al., A Program of Classical
Conditioning Experiments Testing Variations in the Conditioned Stimulus and Context, 18 J.
CONSUMER RES. 1, 9 (1991) (explaining that consumers' attitudes towards high-equity brands are
more resistant to change than their attitudes towards low-equity brands). Interestingly, Swann and
others cannot agree on whether Hyatt resists dilution because it is so strong or because it is so weak.
See Swann, Dilution Redefined, supra note 9, at 610 n.165 ("The explanation, I would submit, is
that Hyatt is only modestly unique: it is a 'personal name' that the district court found to be in
Ireasonably common' use, and may 'already have too many meanings to resist one more."' (quoting
Swann, supra note 111, at 865)).
Another of Jacoby's examples of dilution can also be read as an affirmation of strength. Jacoby
did a dilution survey in Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I, Ltd., 942 F. Supp. 1513, 1547 (S.D. Tex.
1996), affd as modified, 155 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 1998), though it was ultimately decided on
confusion grounds. He claimed to have found dilution because about three-fourths of people
surveyed, all of whom had gone to Tour 18's golf course, now thought that there were two different
places to play a "Pebble Beach hole," Pebble Beach and Tour 18's hole mimicking the layout of a
hole at Pebble Beach. Jacoby, Psychological Foundations, supra note 9, at 1058; Jacoby, Dilution
in Light, supra note 9, at 32. Yet among those diluted respondents, 87% mentioned it as one of the
five most famous golf courses in response to an open-ended question, and 99.6% ranked it in the top
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associations from a junior brand to a senior by keeping the senior brand's
own associations at the forefront of consumers' minds. 17' These results sug-
gest that legal protection for strong marks is unnecessary.
Priming also makes it particularly unlikely that a glancing exposure to a
dilutive mark will cause harm to the senior brand. If a consumer is not pay-
ing attention and does not process the mark, it will just be a subliminal
reminder without generating new and inconsistent meanings. 172  If a
consumer's attention is caught, however, we simply do not know how that
will play out in any particular case-whether it will ultimately reinforce the
original, as the Hyatt tattoo parlor reinforces Hyatt hotels, or dilute it. When
the effect can be either positive or negative, it is a mistake to adopt as the
theory of dilution an explanation that always posits a negative effect.
D. What About Tarnishment?
Most litigation over tarnishment in recent years has focused on
referential uses that, rather than using the senior mark as a source identifier
for the junior user's shoddy products or services, criticize or parody the
senior user. 17 3  Many referential uses are excluded from the scope of the
revised federal dilution law, which exempts parody and criticism, 174 with
consequences discussed in the next Part. One might still hypothesize,
nonetheless, that a junior use could harm the reputation of a senior mark
through other types of negative association, as with the Tiffany's-strip-club
example. 175 As noted in the previous subpart, research on priming contra-
dicts blurring theory, but might suggest a mechanism for tarnishment.
100 when specifically asked about it. Id. at 28. (The corresponding numbers for another plaintiff,
Pinehurst #2, were 25% and 92%. Id.) Jacoby found blurring because Tour 18's customers think
there are two places to play a "Pebble Beach hole," but the survey specifically asked them if they
knew a place outside California that identifies its hole as a "Pebble Beach hole." Jacoby,
Psychological Foundations, supra note 9, at 1057-58. In other words, the survey asked for retrieval
of the junior use but showed no evidence of any effect on the senior user's brand.
171. See infra note 176 (discussing studies that demonstrate the robustness of brand concepts
despite later-acquired negative information).
172. Even Jerre Swann, a great proponent of the cognitive theory, implicitly acknowledges this
when he discusses the way that consumers in low-attention circumstances make broad recognition
judgments so they don't have to waste time on specific processing. See Swann, Interdisciplinary
Approach, supra note 9, at 962 (observing that consumers categorize brands based on a quick
assessment of a few features in order to enhance efficiency in processing information, even if some
details do not exactly match).
173. See, e.g., N.Y. Stock Exch. v. N.Y., N.Y. Hotel, LLC, 293 F.3d 550, 558 (2d Cir. 2002)
(finding that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that a casino's humorous use of a modified
New York Stock Exchange mark would tarnish the Stock Exchange's reputation); Hormel Foods
Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 507-08 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that a wild-boar
character called Spa'am in a Muppet film was a parody that did not tarnish the Sparn trademark),
Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 44-45 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that a competitor's
mocking animation of a small, frightened deer diluted the John Deere mark).
174. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(3) (West Supp. 2007).
175. Cf Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 268-69 (4th
Cir. 2007) (rejecting Louis Vuitton's claim that dog beds and toys using the mark "Chewy Vuiton"
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There is very little empirical work in this area. Marketing researchers
have, however, been extremely interested in a related question: when a strong
existing brand introduces a new product extension that is bad or enters into a
marketing alliance with a partner who turns out to have reputation problems,
does that reflect poorly on the originally strong and popular core brand? In
bad partnerships and failed brand extensions, the trademark owner may have
carefully attempted to maintain brand quality, but consumers judged the at-
tempt a failure.
That brand-extension research suggests that dilution by tarnishment
through the use of a similar mark on a shoddy product is unlikely in the ab-
sence of source confusion because consumers have robust mental concepts of
strong brands. 176  If consumers are given a reason to distinguish an
authorized extension or cobranded product from the core brand-for
example, a name like Courtyard by Marriott instead of Marriott or Coke
BlaK instead of Coke-they will do so, and negative opinions about the ex-
tension will not return to harm opinions of the core brand. 177 If consumers
caused tarnishment because there was no evidence that the products were likely to cause harm to
Louis Vuitton's reputation).
176. See, e.g., Stephen J. Hoch, Product Experience Is Seductive, 29 J. CONSUMER RES. 448,
451 (2002) ("Using a simple associative learning procedure, [researchers] showed that, in a few
trials, people learn brand associations that later block the learning of new predictive attribute
associations."); Deborah Roedder John et al., The Negative Impact of Extensions: Can Flagship
Products Be Diluted?, J. MARKETING, Jan. 1998, at 19, 20 ("[B]eliefs about the flagship product [of
a strong brand] are 'encapsulated' and extremely resistant to change .... ); id. at 27 (finding that
even weakly held beliefs about flagship products resisted change because of the overall strength of
the beliefs associated with the brand). (In John et al.'s research, however, some nonflagship
products, such as minor Johnson & Johnson toiletries, were affected by spillover from bad product-
line extensions. Id. at 24.) Sheff, a dilution proponent, invokes the robustness of initial impressions
to argue that trademarks need dilution protection: "[O]nce a stimulus has been tagged with affective
value, later contrary information about the stimulus's actual meaning or significance will often be
insufficient to significantly alter the affective response." Sheff, supra note 9, at 361; see id. at 362
("By altering the affect pool for a given trademark, uses that generate negative associations lessen
the chance that consumers will choose products bearing that trademark."). But dilution is always a
second comer, and so by this very logic, dilutive uses will always have significant difficulty
displacing original responses.
177. See Amna Kirmani et al., The Ownership Effect in Consumer Responses to Brand Line
Stretches, J. MARKETING, Jan. 1999, at 88, 99 (finding that signaling a difference between the main
brand and the extension prevents dilutive effects on the main brand); Sandra J. Milberg et al.,
Managing Negative Feedback Effects Associated with Brand Extensions: The Impact of Alternative
Branding Strategies, 6 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 119, 136-37 (1997) (finding that subbranding may
prevent negatively evaluated brand extensions from harming the parent brand); Sjodin & T6rn,
supra note 161, at 37 ("Even though consumers elaborate on brand image incongruity, they do not
necessarily change their beliefs about the brand, since mature brands resist change .... If
information has any impact on previous knowledge at all, it will typically be 'subtyped' and treated
as an exception rather than cause a full revision of the previous knowledge."); Nicole L. Votolato &
H. Rao Unnava, Spillover of Negative Information on Brand Alliances, 16 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL.
196, 201 (2006) ("This research suggests that a host brand may generally be quite impervious to
negative publicity surrounding its partner brand; the host brand was only affected when participants
were led to believe that the host knew of and condoned the partner's behavior."); Judith H.
Washburn et al., Co-branding: Brand Equity and Trial Effects, 17 J. CONSUMER MARKETING 591,
600 (2000) ("Our belief that a high equity brand would be denigrated by its pairing with a low
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seize on such fine distinctions for authorized line extensions, it seems im-
plausible that, absent confusion, they will transfer negative opinions between
unrelated products or services.
In other words, recognizing an absence of affiliation should allow
consumers to avoid penalizing the senior brand. One recent dilution
proponent uses the brand-extension studies to support tarnishment theory in a
way that makes this clear:
Consumer psychologists attribute.. . context-sensitive responses to
the cognitive burdens of reconciling the associations a mark activates
in memory with the novel experience of its extension. When
encountered in a new context, the mark triggers a cognitive effort to
"resolve and find meaning in the incongruity," and the success of this
effort generates a positive emotional response. Where the context is
so far removed from that with which the mark is associated that no
resolution of the incongruity is possible, the unsuccessful cognitive
effort to find some resolution "typically stimulate[s] negative feelings
of frustration and helplessness.,
178
Because the brand extension studies were, by definition, premised on au-
thorized extensions, they did not test the possibility that lack of confusion-
the consumer's recognition that a junior use is unauthorized-would resolve
any incongruity (and possibly even increase positive associations with the
brand, in a variant of the benefits of playfulness discussed above).
In the end, strong marks have little to fear from unauthorized
tarnishment. As with the link between dog and bone, any associations with
inferior junior users will remain unidirectional. Instead of a tree of
associations, a better metaphor for mental models of strong brands might be a
city with numerous one-way streets.
E. Other Problems in Empirically Assessing Dilution
Surveys that do not use MRIs will likely dominate trademark law for a
while, if only because MRI studies are even more expensive than standard
trademark surveys. But research on cognition, unfortunately, suggests that it
is much harder to figure out what consumers think about brands through
conventional surveys than practitioners believe.
Surveys in Lanham Act cases have long been criticized as products of
"the survey researcher's black arts."'179 Slight differences in wording produce
very different answers, and dueling surveys with contradictory results are
common. Yet the problem with surveys is deeper than the difficulty of
wording a question to avoid bias. The questions themselves may change a
equity brand was not supported. It seems that the rich association set that accompanies a high
equity brand may insulate it from a less favorable association.").
178. Sheff, supra note 9, at 369 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
179. Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Bait. Football Club Ltd. P'ship, 34 F.3d 410, 416 (7th
Cir. 1994).
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respondent's answers by changing the way she thinks.' 80 Being asked to give
reasons distorts reasoning, especially when the question has little meaning
for the respondent (as the classic dilution question of whether consumers
"associate" one thing with another probably does not). Once an idea has
been brought to a respondent's attention, he often thinks it relevant: "[W]e
come up with a plausible-sounding reason for why we might like or dislike
something, and then we adjust our true preference to be in line with that
plausible-sounding reason."'18 People are not very good at identifying their
own reactions. 182 As a result, to force nonexperts to think deeply about
reactions "is to render their reactions useless."'
183
Thus, when subjects in dilution surveys are told they are doing
marketing research or given some other explanation that does not reveal the
existence of the litigation, they are likely not just to behave differently but to
think differently.' 84 When surveys ask about whether and how a "Michelob
Oily" ad affects a respondent's evaluation of Michelob, asking the question
may ensure that it does.' 85 The unexamined life may or may not be worth
living; the unexamined brand evaluation is very different from the examined
brand evaluation. Because dilution claims center on affect and association
rather than on specific factual claims, dilution surveys are particularly vul-
nerable to such observation-induced distortions.
180. See, e.g., GLADWELL, supra note 1, at 180-81 (stating that asking "why" questions distorts
respondents' reactions, making their answers unreliable gauges for ordinary situations where much
processing is consciously inaccessible (citing Timothy D. Wilson & Jonathan W. Schooler,
Thinking Too Much: Introspection Can Reduce the Quality of Preferences and Decisions, 60 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181 (1991))); id. at 64-71 (stating that making people explain their
choices produces divergence between previously expressed preferences and analyzed preferences);
cf id. at 119-20 (stating that conscious cognition decreases the accuracy of witness identification
because words displace visual memory (citing Chad S. Dodson et al., The Verbal Overshadowing
Effect: Why Descriptions Impair Face Recognition, 25 MEMORY & COGNITION 129 (1997) and
Jonathan W. Schooler et al., Thoughts Beyond Words: When Language Overshadows Insight, 122 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 166 (1993))).
181. GLADWELL, supra note 1, at 181.
182. See id. at 155; ZALTMAN, supra note 14, at 9-11.
183. GLADWELL, supra note 1, at 186; accord Hall, supra note 15, at 30 ("[In tests of recall and
tests of what messages were communicated by an ad,] respondents supply extensive information
about their reactions to copy, but the scores are only relevant to the rational decision-making
processes supplied by the brain's interpreter, not to the actual decision processes that drive target
audience behavior.").
184. See, e.g., ZALTMAN, supra note 14, at 171 ("In one study, researchers discovered that
consumers described their most recent experience at a bar differently depending on the reason they
were given for being interviewed. The different reasons for asking them to share this experience
constituted different goals as well as different stimuli.").
185. The problem may be more acute for dilution surveys than for confusion surveys because
dilution surveys are more likely to ask about emotions and purchase intentions rather than about
factual beliefs as to the association between two products or services. Cf Vicki G. Morwitz &
Gavan J. Fitzsimons, The Mere-Measurement Effect: Why Does Measuring Intentions Change
Actual Behavior?, 14 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 64, 64 (2004) (arguing that questions about
intentions do not reveal preexisting intentions but instead often lead consumers to construct




Given the available evidence, the cognitive model of dilution lacks
enough empirical support to justify its adoption as a general theory underly-
ing dilution law. There is still too much we do not know about how
consumers process marks in the marketplace. At a minimum, we cannot pre-
dict that any particular dilutive use will produce the difficulties posited by
the cognitive model.
V. Normative Implications
Suppose, however, that we set aside the evidence discussed in the
previous Part and accept that the internal-search-costs model is completely
correct. Consumers automatically respond to trademarks in predictable
ways. Trademarks are strong enough to constitute product attributes in their
own right and to induce purchases, but they are also fragile--capable of los-
ing that selling power if other people promiscuously attach associations to
them. Even so, the dilution law we have now would be incapable of
fulfilling the protective function assigned to it, and we would not want a
dilution law that actually gave trademark owners control over all unauthor-
ized acts likely to affect consumers' perceptions of marks. The following
subparts address why the psychological evidence undercuts, rather than
bolsters, dilution law as we know it.
A. Cognition, Commerce, and the First Amendment
The internal-search-costs model cannot explain why dilution should be
limited to commercial uses or what the revised dilution law calls "use of a
mark or trade name in commerce."' 186 As Laura Heymann puts it:
A dilution action essentially argues . .. '[W]e have spent a lot of
money and effort on telling consumers what they should think about
our brand, and the defendant's activities have caused them to think
something different.' . . . The brand owner, in other words, is
claiming a right to the exclusive mental association with the brand in
the minds of the public. 18
7
186. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(1) (West Supp. 2007). The revised law apparently governs only a
defendant's use of a trademark as a mark for its own goods or services. But even if it reaches more
broadly, many uses of a mark-in casual conversation, in newspaper stories, and so on-will not be
covered. For more on the use-of-a-mark versus use-as-a-mark debate, see Beebe, supra note 40, at
1144-45 and Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Dilution's (Still) Uncertain Future, 105
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 98, 100-02 (2006), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/first
impressions/vol 1 05/dinwoodie.pdf.
187. Laura A. Heymann, Metabranding and Intermediation: A Response to Professor
Fleischer, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 201, 218-19 (2007). In other words, dilution becomes a
version of tortious interference with expected contractual relations, without the many limitations on
that disfavored tort. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766C (1979) (providing no liability
for negligent interference with contractual relations); id. § 767 (listing factors determining whether
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Despite the breadth of this claim, dilution law does not attempt to
regulate all activities that can change consumers' mental associations with
trademarks. In fact, federal dilution law now grants a remedy only when a
defendant uses a famous trademark to identify its own goods or services.
88
There are excellent reasons for this modesty, which exempts large amounts
of noncommercial and commercial conduct, as explored in sections V(A)(1)
and V(A)(2). Despite the limits on the scope of the law, the phenomenon the
law calls dilution is everywhere. Dilution law targets the mote in the trade-
mark owner's eye, not the beam in the consumer's. In section V(A)(3), I
argue that such substantial underinclusiveness renders dilution law uncon-
stitutional under the governing First Amendment standards for regulation of
truthful noncommercial speech.
1. The Larger Universe of Dilutive Uses.-Unfortunately for trademark
owners (though not for the rest of us), market conditions preclude trademark
owners from controlling associations in the way the cognitive theory of dilu-
tion promises. To begin with, new neuroscience studies provide evidence for
advertisers' long-held belief that much advertising is completely useless. In
MRI studies, "a third to a half of commercials do not generate any brain re-
action at all."' 189 Not all attempts to appropriate consumers' mental real
estate succeed; labor alone does not create neural value. Those commercials
that do penetrate may entice, but they inherently trigger both positive and
negative associations, as consumers' minds remind themselves that they
can't buy everything that looks good.' 90
Even if a lone mark might colonize consumers' minds, marks are never
alone. In the blooming, buzzing confusion of the modern marketplace,
trademarks are constantly thrown at us, jostling shoulders in ways that ensure
multiple associations, whether from the hundreds of marks visible side by
side in Times Square or the dozens that obscure the uniforms and cars of
intentional interference with contractual relations is improper); id. § 768 (setting forth legitimate
acts of intentional interference with contractual relations to promote competition).
188. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Trademark Use Requirement in Dilution
Cases, SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. (forthcoming), available at
http://www.scu.edu/law/tmdilution/File/Lemley-Dogan-TheTrademark Use-Requirement in Dil
utionCasesdraft.pdf (discussing the new "use as a mark" requirements in federal dilution law).
189. Kenneth Chang, Enlisting Science's Lessons to Entice More Shoppers to Spend More,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2006, at F3.
190. As Kenneth Chang reported:
In commercials that did spur brain activity, reactions appeared to be in conflict, Dr.
Freedman [a clinical professor of psychiatry at U.C.L.A.] said. "Almost always, if you
activated one part of the brain," he said, "you activated many competing parts of the
brain." For example, an appealing car commercial might activate not only ... the parts
of the brain that shout, "Wow, I want that car now!" but also the amygdala, the part of
the brain associated with fear and anxiety, perhaps warning, "That would be a stupid
impulsive thing to do."
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NASCAR drivers. 191 And this affects brand evaluations: one study found
that the cognitive processing consumers engage in before turning to a brand
significantly affects recognition of and liking for that brand. 192  Physical
proximity of other brands alone is enough to affect judgment.1 93
The same relentless pressure of advertising that supposedly requires
legal protection for the ability of a unique mark to cut through ad clutter
itself drowns marks in multiple uncontrollable contexts. Trademark owners
create authorized MySpace pages for characters and products to take advan-
tage of a new marketing channel, and consumers then associate them with
dozens of other non-owner-approved "friends."' 194  Some consumers even
appropriate the official versions to advertise themselves. 95 These juxtaposi-
tions create mental associations, and thus the cognitive model predicts that
they dilute. Legitimate branded products appear in discount stores because
of resales or transfers in the retail chain, and mere presence in a low-prestige
store can affect brand perceptions. 196 In fact, if we care about associations as
the cognitive theory requires, competition itself dilutes-the simple presence
of a competing product interferes with retrieval of other brands.1
97
191. One might argue that trademark owners can control side-by-side exposures through
contract. But in most cases, they lack the ability to do so. A McDonald's might discover that the
Gap next door lost its lease and is now a Hooters. Eric Goldman has written about the pervasive
constraints faced by most manufacturers, giving retailers substantial control over how a particular
brand will be categorized and displayed to consumers. See Eric Goldman, Brand Spillovers (Aug.
3, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/ipsc/
papers2/goldman.pdf.
192. See Antonia Kronlund & Daniel M. Bernstein, Unscrambling Words Increases Brand
Name Recognition and Preference, 20 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 681, 684 (2006) ("These
results introduce the possibility that the actual brand of water [a thirsty shopper looks at] matters
less than the decision-making processes that came immediately before seeing the bottled water. In a
shopping context, this may involve processing of other brands (e.g. of a candy bar), although it may
also involve the processing of ordinary words (e.g. on a store display or magazine cover).").
193. See Irwin P. Levin & Aron M. Levin, Modeling the Role of Brand Alliances in the
Assimilation of Product Evaluations, 9 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 43, 47-49 (2000) (finding that
mere physical proximity of restaurants led to attitude transfer between them among research
subjects, though less than when the restaurants were explicitly cobranded). But see supra notes
176-77 and accompanying text (noting that absent confusion or good reason, consumers resist
punishing strong brands for negative associations).
194. See Elizabeth Holmes, On MySpace, Millions of Users Make "Friends " with Ads, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 7, 2006, at B 1 (discussing MySpace pages created by marketers for movie characters,
mascots, and products).
195. See, e.g., id. (reporting that a MySpace patron used the profile picture of "Ricky Bobby"
as his own picture in an effort to promote his disc-jockeying business).
196. See Kyoungmi Lee & Sharon Shavitt, The Use of Cues Depends on Goals: Store
Reputation Affects Product Judgments when Social Identity Goals Are Salient, 16 J. CONSUMER
PSYCHOL. 260, 268 (2006) (finding that when people are thinking about their self-concepts, store
reputation affects evaluation of the brands the store carries, and this effect is spontaneously self-
generated for items tied to self-concept, such as watches or clothing); cf Heymann, supra note 187,
at 220-21 (discussing how intermediaries, such as reporters, can distort brand messages).
197. See Frank R. Kardes et al., Construal-Level Effects on Preference Stability, Preference-
Behavior Correspondence, and the Suppression of Competing Brands, 16 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL.
135, 137 (2006) (finding that the presence of a brand makes it more salient, inhibiting the activation
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Noncommercial uses should also dilute according to the cognitive
model, although noncommercial uses are excluded from the coverage of di-
lution law. Tiffany is currently a well-recognized name for a girl. The
existence of girls named Tiffany and the ability of people to say "I'm going
to hang out at Tiffany's" should therefore interfere with immediate recogni-
tion of the mark. The problem is not limited to trademarks with widely
recognized nontrademark meanings because parents now routinely use
trademarks as inspiration for children's names, just as previous generations
turned to virtues or to inspiring people. In 2005, more than 500 infants were
named Armani; more than 260 girls were named Chanel; and Dodge, Polo,
and Camry all made double digits. 98 As far as we know, the brain has no
use-in-commerce requirement or other distinction that would keep references
to Tiffany-the-girl from activating thoughts of Tiffany's-the-jeweler, or vice
versa. It is likely that the contexts of shopping versus friendship help us dis-
tinguish the two-but that is simply to restate the objection that even
identical terms are not dilutive when put in context.
All sorts of people have opinions about products and marks, and those
opinions promiscuously create associations. Yochai Benkler's discussion of
Google's search engine results for the term Barbie illustrates both blurring
and tarnishment from noncommercial uses. The top results from his Google
search, in order, were: Mattel's official site; the official collectors' site;
of mental images of other brands); id. at 140-42 (finding that cuing with candy bars-Lindt,
Ghiradelli, and Cadbury-inhibited recognition of Snickers, Butterfinger, Three Musketeers, etc. as
candy bars); Krishnan & Chakravarti, supra note 155, at 13 (finding that competitive ads interfere
with recall and recognition); Noel, supra note 154, at 306-07 (finding that competing ads for
products of the same type decrease memory for any one brand). General explanations of the harm
of dilution-the junior use can decrease awareness of the senior brand, can make the senior brand's
associations less favorable, and can make the senior brand's associations shared rather than
unique-make quite clear that the source of harm is often competition or some other change in the
marketplace, rather than a trademark-specific phenomenon. See Steckel et al., supra note 157, at
625 ("Suppose that a competitor to VOLVO introduced and heavily promoted a new model called
'Super Safe' and succeeded in displacing Volvo as the perceived safety leader.... [T]he brand and
the power of the VOLVO trademark would be damaged, but not because of the use of the same or
similar name or logo. One could possibly say that the trademark has been metaphorically diluted,
but there is no trademark dilution in a legal sense."); Swann, Dilution Redefined, supra note 9, at
620 ("A form of dilution does occur, of course, when PEPSI, for example, brings COKE to mind.
To those to whom COKE means cola (and cola means COKE), the introduction of PEPSI causes a
measure of product category dilution--COKE no longer is the sole cola schema in the consumer's
mind.... Only association that is substantially brand triggered counts in a dilution calculus ......
(citation omitted)).
198. Kortney Stringer, Brand-Named Babies: Parents Seek to Be Different-Or Just Make
Money, DETROIT FREE PRESS, June 12, 2006, § Business, at 1E. In 2000, names given to five or
more children in the United States included Armani, Aviance, Breck, Camry, Canon, Cartier,
Catera, Celica, Chanel, Chevy, Coty, Dannon, Darvon, Delmonte, Dior, Disney, Dodge, Evian,
Guinness, Halston, Hyatt, Ikea, Infiniti, Jantzen, Jetta, Josten, Lexus, Loreal, Ronrico, Ruger, Saran,
Skyy, and Timberland. See Cleveland Kent Evans, Brand Names as Baby Names (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Texas Law Review). A few children have been named Espn, for the
sports network. See Stringer, supra. Parents have also auctioned off both temporary and permanent




AdiosBarbie.com (critical of Barbie); a Barbie-collectible magazine; a quiz,
If You Were a Barbie, Which Messed Up Version Would You Be?; the Visible
Barbie Project (Barbies sliced through as if vivisected); Barbie: The Image of
Us All (undergraduate paper on the cultural history of Barbie); a Barbie and
Ken sex animation; a Barbie dressed as a suicide bomber; and Barbies
dressed and painted as countercultural images.' 99 As Benkler explains:
The little girl who searches for Barbie on Google will encounter a
culturally contested figure .... [I]n an environment where relevance
is measured in non-market action-placing a link to a Web site be-
cause you deem it relevant to whatever you are doing with your Web
site-as opposed to in dollars, Barbie has become a more transparent
cultural object. It is easier for the little girl to see that the doll is not
only a toy, not only a symbol of beauty and glamour, but also a
symbol of how norms of female beauty in our society can be
oppressive to women and girls .... [The search results show] that
Barbie can have multiple meanings .... 200
The Internet makes these multiple meanings easier to see alongside the
official story, but its effects are far from unique. Trademark owners wince
when the "wrong" sorts of people use their products, changing them from
upmarket to low class. °1 Consider also the multiple uses in news reporting
and other noncommercial speech of the suffix Mc to indicate convenience,
cheapness, uniformity, and other qualities associated with McDonald's-
199. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 286 tbl.8.1 (2006); see also Mattel, Inc.
v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 903-04 (9th Cir. 2002) ("MCA's use of the [Barbie] mark [for
the song title Barbie Girl] is dilutive.... [A]fter the song's popular success, some consumers
hearing Barbie's name will think of both the doll and the song, or perhaps of the song only. This is
a classic blurring injury ..... " (footnote omitted)); Simonson, supra note 87, at 26 (explaining that
parodies are a type of dilution "in which the new brand name or its product category creates an
additional association between the original brand and some unwanted perception").
200. BENKLER, supra note 199, at 287; see also Julie Bosman, Agencies Are Watching as Ads
Go Online, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2006, at C6 (discussing spoof ads that attack products or offer
inconsistent meanings for the brand and quoting a creative director who describes such spoofs as
"brand terrorism," while acknowledging that companies can do little to control them); Micro
Persuasion, Study: Wikipedia Dominates Brand Search Results, http://www.micropersuasion.com/
2006/09/study-wikipedia.html (Sept. 11, 2006, 14:23) (observing that Wikipedia entries on brands
often appear in the first ten search results on Google and that the entries often contain negative
information, and noting that unique trademarks are likely to have highly ranked Wikipedia entries).
201. See, e.g., Kathryn Bold, Fashion Flares: Back-to-School Shopping Comes with Warning
Signals, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1994, at El (discussing how sports-team logos have been
appropriated by gangs); Clare Coulson, You've Been WAGGED!, TELEGRAPH, Aug. 9, 2006,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/fashion/main.jhtml?xml=/fashion/2006/08/09/efwag9.xml&sSheet=-/fa
shion/2006/08/09/ixfashion.html (discussing how designers are "fighting to protect their brands
from being endorsed by the 'wrong' sort of celebrity"). Some brands have struggled with an
"urban"-that is, African-American-image, which reworks the meaning of the brand. Timberland,
for example, initially resisted the brand's appropriation by young African-Americans because the
company feared that would drive away other purchasers. See Dan Glaister, A Kick Up the Nineties,
GUARDIAN, Apr. 28, 1994, at 15 (discussing controversial comments about urban consumers by
Timberland's chief operating officer); see also Douglas Century, Jay-Z Puts a Cap on Cristal, N.Y.
TIMES, July 2, 2006, § 9, at 1 (discussing the rapper's response to comments by Cristal's president
suggesting that an association with rap could hurt the brand). But the law creates no recourse.
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McJob, McPaper, McArt, McLawyers.2 °2 Even if McDonald's can enjoin
McSleep Inns, 203 the pervasive communicative uses of Mc as shorthand for a
set of qualities keeps the mark's meanings from being locked down.2 °4
Setting aside the widespread unauthorized use of brands as sources of
meaning, unauthorized uses of marks directly tied to their core function of
product or service identification abound and dilute, creating associations that
conflict with the trademark owner's preferred image. Peer groups and
groups we admire have powerful effects on our mental models of brands.20 5
Word of mouth is more powerful than advertising in selling-or killing-
products. 20 6 Reviews affect perceptions of quality. 207 It is possible to con-
vince people that they liked a product that they specifically said they disliked
by showing them positive reviews (or vice versa, turning positive opinions
202. See, e.g., Cathleen McGuigan, The McMansion Next Door, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 27, 1993, at
85 (describing McMansions as architecturally undistinguished, mass produced, and relatively
inexpensive); see also supra note 167 and accompanying text.
203. See Quality Inns Int'l, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198, 221-22 (D. Md.
1988).
204. See Shuy, supra note 107, at 4-5 (discussing the Quality Inns case). Consider also the
common phrase "a few fries short of a Happy Meal."
205. See ALEX WIPPERFORTH, BRAND HIJACK: MARKETING WITHOUT MARKETING 132
(2005) ("Studies show that social groups influence 80 percent of all purchases."); Austin, supra note
9, at 902 ("Some research into the sources of consumer desires suggests that among the most
powerful stimulators of desire to purchase goods are the goods friends and family have already
purchased."); Terry L. Childers & Akshay R. Rao, The Influence of Familial and Peer-Based
Reference Groups on Consumer Decisions, 19 J. CONSUMER RES. 198, 206-08 (1992) (finding
significant influence on brand choice); Jennifer Edson Escalas & James R. Bettman, You Are What
They Eat: The Influence of Reference Groups on Consumers' Connections to Brands, 13 J.
CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 339, 339 (2003) (finding that consumers value brands based on the brands'
perceived relationships to groups to which consumers belong or to which they aspire).
206. See Rajdeep Grewal et al., Early-Entrant Advantage, Word-of-Mouth Communication,
Brand Similarity, and the Consumer Decision-Making Process, 13 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 187,
188 (2003) ("[Word of mouth] significantly influences product evaluations and purchase decisions.
In fact, [it] has been shown to be more powerful than printed information primarily because [word
of mouth] information is considered to be more credible." (citations omitted)); Russell N. Laczniak
et al., Consumers' Responses to Negative Word-of-Mouth Communication: An Attribution Theory
Perspective, I I J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 57, 57-58 (2001) (reviewing the research consensus on the
powerful influence of word of mouth, including research showing that negative word of mouth is
more harmful than positive word of mouth is helpful); Robert E. Smith & Christine A. Vogt, The
Effects of Integrating Advertising and Negative Word-of-Mouth Communications on Message
Processing and Response, 4 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 133, 145-46 (1995) (finding that ads increase
the credibility of negative word of mouth by triggering skepticism).
207. See, e.g., JENKINS, supra note 160, at 80 (discussing group tastemaking in online
communities); Eric Goldman, Online Word of Mouth and Its Implications for Trademark Law, in
TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH (Graeme B.
Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., forthcoming 2008) (stating that reviews and word of mouth affect
consumer perceptions and that these effects are vastly multiplied on the Internet); Chris Gaither,
Where Everyone Is a Critic, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2006, at Al (discussing a consumer review Web
site with a powerful effect on businesses); Bob Tedeschi, Help for the Merchant in Navigating a
Sea of Shopper Opinions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2006, at C5 ("Scores of Internet merchants have
recently begun following Amazon's lead by posting customer reviews-both flattering and
flaming--of products they sell. ... '[C]onsumers will trust the voice of another customer before
they trust the retailer or manufacturer."' (quoting a Petco executive)).
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negative). Not only will their evaluations become more positive, but they
will insist that their initial opinions were also positive.20 8 If that's so, then
dilution law should be especially concerned about negative reviews, and yet
such reviews are exempt. General news reporting, which also falls outside
the scope of dilution law, can have the same dilutive effects as word of
mouth. When ABC publicized apparently unsanitary practices at the grocery
chain Food Lion, for example, the company's brand equity was devastated.20 9
This evidence illustrates that noncovered dilutive uses are common and
also that consumers process trademarks in noncommercial settings, from
news reporting to casual conversation, in ways that affect their perceptions of
the mark in commercial settings.210 There certainly are differences in how
people process information depending on context, as our general attempts to
ignore most advertising illustrate. But when we pay attention, we do not seg-
regate our mental models of trademarks depending on whether the source of
information was commercial or noncommercial, or on whether the source
used a trademark as an identifier of its own goods or services.
In sum, the set of commercial uses subject to dilution regulation is small
compared to the set of uses that are noncommercial, expressive, or otherwise
nonactionable and that according to the cognitive model, must also dilute.
2. The Exception for Comparative Advertising.-U.S. law gives
substantially greater protection to advertising that makes specific reference to
a competitor than does the law of many other countries. 211 This is a deliber-
ate choice, reflected in federal dilution law's explicit exception for
212comparative advertising. But what is comparative advertising for? It gets
a consumer's attention and creates an association between the two competing
products. If we take the cognitive-processing model of dilution seriously,
this should constitute a most insidious kind of dilution because it takes some
milliseconds for a consumer to realize that this is a comparative ad,
necessarily creating an association between the trademark owner and its
208. See, e.g., ZALTMAN, supra note 14, at 190 (discussing a study of the effects of movie
reviews); see also id. at 12-13, 166-67, 180-81 (describing how exposure to others' evaluations
changes consumers' memories of their own experiences with products or services). The
malleability of memory extends beyond advertising-induced change. See supra note 25 and
accompanying text.
209. See, e.g., Thomas McArdle, ABC's Food Lyin', NAT'L REv., Feb. 10, 1997, at 42, 42
(noting that after the television report on unsanitary practices at Food Lion, the company's stock
"crumbled, and earnings reached twenty-year lows").
210. See Sheff, supra note 9, at 360 ("[Dirinking a cold beverage on a hot day, getting a
product recall notice, seeing an aesthetically pleasing advertisement, or reading a news report that a
household product contains a potent carcinogen are all experiences that would modify the affect
pool for the products and trademarks involved and would accordingly make a consumer more or
less likely to choose products bearing the implicated trademarks." (footnote omitted)).
211. See, e.g., Charlotte J. Romano, Comparative Advertising in the United States and in
France, 25 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 371,377-80 (2005).
212. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(i) (West Supp. 2007).
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competitor. No matter what happens next, the consumer's web of associa-
tions with the trademark were activated and then tied to the competitor's ad,
One could even easily interpret the milliseconds of (mis)recognition as
"initial interest confusion." That doctrine originally assumed that consumers
took some action as the result of initial interest, such as entering a store, but
has expanded to dilution-like contours under the pressure of Internet
litigation.213 A recent case, SMJ Group, Inc. v. 417 Lafayette Restaurant
LLC,2 14 suggests that any use of a mark creates initial interest confusion. The
defendant, a nonprofit organization for restaurant workers' rights, created a
pamphlet protesting the plaintiffs employment practices. 25  The pamphlet
had the plaintiffs logo on the front.21 6  The plaintiff sued for trademark
infringement, and the court found a likelihood of initial interest confusion
because the logo would create an association with the restaurant at first
glance, even though that initial confusion would immediately dissipate.217
Comparative advertising works similarly.
There is no push among trademark owners to eliminate the comparative-
advertising exception for dilution, presumably because they realize that they
will often prefer comparative advertising themselves. Nor are many courts
likely to suppress many anticorporate protests as trademark infringement.
Even the court in SMJ ultimately denied an injunction on the ground that the
defendants' protest message didn't cause the type of irreparable harm trade-
mark law targets.218  But the comparative-advertising exception, and the
related exception for "nominative" uses that identify a trademark in order to
talk about the products or services it represents, suggests that there is some-
thing very wrong with the attention/association model of dilution. 219 Like the
noncommercial-use exception, the comparative-advertising exception and the
nominative-fair-use doctrine demonstrate that numerous other considerations
routinely outweigh the supposed harms of dilution.
213. See, e.g., N.Y. State Soc'y of Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis Assocs., Inc., 79 F.
Supp. 2d 331, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that the defendant's use of another organization's
trademark created initial interest confusion and also violated the trademark dilution provisions of
the FTDA).
214. 439 F. Supp. 2d 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
215. Id. at 285.
216. Id.
217. Id. at288.
218. See id. at 295 (distinguishing harmful customer diversion from legitimate substantive
criticism for purposes of assessing irreparable harm).
219. Sheffs discussion of why truthful uses of another's mark should be prohibited, for
example, purports to accept comparative advertising but in fact gives reasons why comparative
advertising should be banned. See Sheff, supra note 9, at 385 ("Allowing second comers to use
existing marks where such uses provide accurate information about the second comer's product
would obviously invite abuse and gamesmanship, and distinguishing between helpful and
misleading uses would be a costly endeavor.").
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3. First Amendment Implications of the Empirical Failure of the
Ownership Claim.-Free-speech concerns animated many of the formal
exceptions to the federal dilution law. Given how little is left for dilution
once noncommercial uses, parody, criticism, comparative advertising, and so
on are largely exempted, one might argue that the remaining prohibitions are
simply not very significant, at least if trademark owners don't overclaim their
rights in ways that deter protected conduct. Current dilution law targets di-
lution that while likely not as harmful as trademark owners think, is also not
particularly beneficial for society. After all, what good does the existence of
Buick aspirin do for anyone?
I am not sanguine that the exceptions will prove as robust as they
should. 220  If a court truly believes the search-cost theory, it will see harm
from many parodic and critical uses, and where there is harm there is an im-
pulse to grant a remedy. In such cases, it will often be possible to say that
the parodist or critic is using the mark at issue as a mark for its own goods or
services, meaning that the exemptions will not apply.221 In one ongoing case,
for example, Wal-Mart is litigating against a critic who produced T-shirts
displaying the term "WAL*OCAUST" and a graphic combining a Nazi eagle
with a Wal-Mart smiley face. 222  Given that T-shirts often display
trademarks, it would be relatively easy to decide that these T-shirts fall
within the scope of the revised law and tarnish the Wal-Mart trademark.
Even if courts interpret the exceptions expansively, there are still First
Amendment objections to the few uses that will be covered by dilution law-
nondeceptive uses of famous marks to identify unrelated products. Others
have begun to address how the commercial-speech doctrine should apply to
dilution law, arguing that dilution protection does not serve a significant
government interest and otherwise fails the Supreme Court's test for
220. Doctrines counseling caution in suppressing referential uses like parody can prove
precarious; not all courts are particularly solicitous of parodists, who can seem like they're just
mocking for the sake of mockery, or even of comparative advertisers, who often seem to be free
riding on major brands' investments. See, e.g., People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v.
Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 367 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding that the "People Eating Tasty Animals"
parody Web site infringed plaintiffs trademark); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ'ns, 28 F.3d
769, 777 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding "Michelob Oily" parody to be infringing); McNeil-PPC, Inc. v.
Guardian Drug Co., 984 F. Supp. 1066, 1074 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (finding that the defendant's
similar trade dress with a "compare to" message on generic products infringed plaintiff's trade dress
for a lactose-intolerance aid).
221. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(3)(A) (West Supp. 2007) (excluding from dilution liability the
fair use of a trademark in connection with comparative advertising, criticism, or parody, other than
as a designation of source for that person's own goods or services).
222. See Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 475 F. Supp. 2d
1318 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (No. 1:06-cv-526-TCB), 2006 WL 849988, available at http://www.
citizen.org/documents/Complaintandexhibit.pdf (seeking a declaratory judgment that the products
do not violate trademark laws and that the First Amendment forbids application of such laws to the
products); Press Release, Public Citizen, Wal-Mart Critic Has First Amendment Right to Sell
'Walocaust' Items, Maintain Web Site Critical of Retail Giant, Public Citizen Tells Court (Mar. 7,
2006), available at http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/release.cfn?ID=2148 (reviewing the suit
against Wal-Mart and related background facts).
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regulations of truthful commercial speech.223 By contrast, Stacey Dogan and
Mark Lemley suggest that the search-costs model of dilution, by identifying
harm to consumers, bolsters dilution against the numerous First Amendment
attacks to which it has been subjected.224
If the cognitive model is correct, consumer protection could provide a
government interest strong enough to pass the Supreme Court's scrutiny.
225
But there are other requirements for constitutional commercial-speech
regulations, specifically the extent to which a regulation properly targets the
identified harm. The enormous disconnect between the cognitive-processing
explanations of dilution and the scope of dilution law offers a simple
223. See, e.g., Mary LaFrance, No Reason to Live: Dilution Laws as Unconstitutional
Restrictions on Commercial Speech, 58 S.C. L. REV. 709 (2007) (suggesting that any harm caused
by dilution does not affect the public interest and that dilution laws violate the First Amendment by
constraining commercial speech without promoting a substantial government interest).
224. See Dogan & Lemley, Right of Publicity, supra note 54, at 1218 n.269 ("One benefit of
understanding dilution law as we have explained it elsewhere-as directed at reducing consumer
search costs-is that our approach may reduce the tension between dilution law and the First
Amendment." (citing Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile
Theory orFaitAccompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461 (2005))); see also Brian A. Jacobs, Note, Trademark
Dilution on the Constitutional Edge, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 161, 202 (2004) (arguing that treating
dilution as based on search costs and efficiency considerations satisfies the substantial interest and
tailoring requirements of the commercial-speech doctrine). First Amendment criticisms of dilution
law abound, though none of them have yet addressed the search-costs argument. E.g., Ann Bartow,
Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721, 796-817 (2004); Denicola, supra note 163;
Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Policing the Border Between Trademarks and Free Speech: Protecting
Unauthorized Trademark Use in Expressive Works, 80 WASH. L. REV. 887 (2005); Robert N.
Kravitz, Trademarks, Speech, and the Gay Olympics Case, 69 B.U. L. REV. 131 (1989).
225. LaFrance disagrees that dilution could serve a substantial government interest. See
LaFrance, supra note 223, at 716 ("[T]he supposed harms that dilution laws prevent or remedy are
either nonexistent, insubstantial, or relevant only to the ability of businesses to derive profits from
consumers without bestowing any commensurate public benefits such as lower prices, better
products, greater product choices, or better information to assist consumers in making their
choices."); id. at 719 ("[A]ny harm to the value of the trademarks affected by dilutive speech
interferes only with the ability of the trademark owners to psychologically manipulate consumers.
Preserving the ability of trademark owners to influence consumers in this way does not amount to a
substantial governmental interest."). I think LaFrance is overly optimistic about the constraints the
"substantial interest" prong of the commercial-speech test imposes on government. Almost
anything can be a "substantial interest." See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492
U.S. 469, 475 (1989) (holding that "promoting an educational rather than commercial atmosphere
on SUNY's campuses, promoting safety and security, preventing commercial exploitation of
students, and preserving residential tranquility" were all substantial government interests for
commercial-speech purposes); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796-97 (1989)
(holding that controlling noise levels in a public park was a substantial government interest). In the
post-New Deal era, the fact that a regulation benefits only one set of private interests is no barrier to
upholding it. The only time that an asserted interest is not "substantial" is when the loopholes
contained in the challenged regulation make it clear that the government doesn't really want to
promote that interest; as a result, this prong of the test is in practice hostage to whether the
regulation has a reasonable fit to the interest. See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal.,
468 U.S. 364, 385 n.16 (1984) (noting that significant underinclusiveness made a regulation
"unrelated" to the asserted purpose, suggesting that the government's interest was not substantial);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976) (finding no "substantial societal interest" was furthered by
a regulation with enormous loopholes).
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analogy: City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.2 2 6 In that case, the
Supreme Court ruled that the city could not target commercial speech by
banning news racks containing commercial handbills but permitting news
racks containing traditional newspapers.2 27 The city's rationale was that
news racks interfered with the safety and beauty of the public streets.228
While the city conceded that it could not ban news racks containing fully
protected speech like that of the New York Times, it argued that it could ban
commercial speech, which is less valuable. 9
The problem with the city's argument was that the nature of the speech
conveyed by the news racks, commercial or not, had nothing to do with their
effects on safety and aesthetics. There were 62 commercial news racks that
the city wished removed, but between 1,500 and 2,000 news racks selling
conventional newspapers would remain.2 30 This complete absence of fit be-
tween the harm and the targeted speech invalidated the law.23'
The similarities between Discovery Network and dilution law,
understood as a measure against mental clutter, indicate that dilution also
irrationally targets commercial speech for a harm done by a much larger set
of speech acts.232 Unlike infringing uses of trademarks, diluting uses are not
deceptive or misleading. 3  A dilutive use harms the value of a trademark the
way litter harms a street, polluting its once-clean message. Noncommercial
dilution, because it is so much more common, is much more likely to cause
such pollution than Buick-aspirin-type commercial dilution. Multiple, large-
scale commercial imitations are simply unlikely to materialize and certainly
much less likely than pervasive noncommercial references like the Barbie
commentaries and children's names discussed above.234
226. 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
227. Id. at 428.
228. Id. at412.
229. Id. at 415.
230. Id. at417-18.
231. Id.; see also Caf& Erotica of Fla., Inc. v. St. Johns County, 360 F.3d 1274, 1291 (1lth Cir.
2004) (holding that safety and aesthetics were "not truly furthered" by an ordinance that restricted
the size of political signs while allowing commercial signs to be much larger).
232. Eugene Volokh has drawn on Discovery Network to argue that the FTDA's exclusion of
noncommercial speech is content based, but to my knowledge no one has yet made this direct
analogy. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After
Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 697, 707-08 (2003).
233. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, and Free Speech: The Implications of
44 Liquormart, 1996 SUP. CT. REv. 123, 157 ("[M]ost of what Madison Avenue sells is product
image. Even under the existing notion that the government has broad leeway to control misleading
commercial speech, it is not generally claimed that such imagistic associations are deceptive.").
234. As J. Thomas McCarthy has noted:
[T]he theory of dilution by blurring assumes that if one small user can blur the sharp
focus of the famous mark to uniquely signify one source, then another and another
small user can and will do so. Like being stung by a hundred bees, significant injury is
caused by the cumulative effect, not by just one .... Many of us have been stung by
one bee and no more stings immediately followed .... Why should courts assume
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Discovery Network indicates that the First Amendment bars substantial
underinclusiveness when that underinclusiveness makes the regulation inef-
fective at solving the targeted problem.235  Here, the First Amendment
prevents Congress from doing the equivalent of taking a thimbleful of water
out of an overflowing bathtub. Even if the thimbleful hasn't been shown to
be valuable in itself,236 removing it isn't a realistic response to the identified
harm. The Supreme Court now requires evidence that regulations of truthful
commercial speech are likely to have a real effect on the problem targeted by
the legislature237-for dilution, by hypothesis, increased mental search costs.
A limited dilution law simply can't do so.
One response to a Discovery Network-type First Amendment challenge
could be to identify the harm of dilution as that caused by free riding. Not
the mental effects but the commercial advantage to the junior user justifies
distinguishing commercial diluting uses from noncommercial diluting
uses.238 At least, this argument runs, we can protect firms from other firms'
commercial dilutive uses, even if other actions may eventually change the
meaning of the mark. Commercial uses of a mark are simply less valuable
than noncommercial uses and can be suppressed for reasons that wouldn't
support the suppression of speech across the board.
I do not find this argument particularly persuasive, mainly because free
riding is endemic to a functioning economy.239 Moreover, a noncompetitor's
without proof that multiple uses will follow if this one, relatively insignificant, use is
allowed to continue?
McCarthy, supra note 54, at 735 (footnotes omitted); see also supra notes 198-200 and
accompanying text.
235. 507 U.S. at 418-19; see also Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S.
173, 190 (1999) (holding that a regulation of truthful commercial speech pervaded with exemptions
and inconsistencies fails the requirement that the regulation directly advance a substantial
government interest); id. at 193-94 ("Even under the degree of scrutiny that we have applied in
commercial speech cases, decisions that select among speakers conveying virtually identical
messages are in serious tension with the principles undergirding the First Amendment.").
236. An underlying assumption of current First Amendment doctrine is that truthful commercial
speech has inherent value that puts the burden on those who would suppress it. If people enjoy
buying Buick aspirin, that is reason enough to let them do so because the First Amendment
considers their preferences at least as valid as the preferences of those who would like to have only
one meaning for Buick.
237. See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1993) ("[A] governmental body seeking to
sustain a restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and
that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree."); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980) ("[T]he regulation may not be
sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the government's purpose.").
238. I thank Graeme Austin for pressing me on this point.
239. See generally Robert G. Bone, A Skeptical View of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act,
11 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 187, 194 (2007) ("[I]t is hard to imagine a case of free riding in which
the defendant has no legitimate reason to use the mark. It is always possible to argue that use of the
mark avoids duplicative investment in creating the same public associations and also benefits
consumers by offering a new product with those meanings and associations attached."); Mark A.
Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEXAS L. REv. 1031 (2005)
(defending much free riding). Well-accepted examples of free riding on trademarks include
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free riding doesn't damage a trademark owner (as opposed to the junior
user's competitors, like Joe's Diner forced to compete against the classy-
sounding Tiffany's Restaurant) unless and until a significant number of the
trademark owner's customers suffer from dilution. The harm of free riding
without damage to the trademark owner is elusive. Nor does the label free
riding serve to distinguish unprotected dilution from, for example, protected
literary uses, such as The Electric Kool-Aid Acid Test 240 and Barbie Girl.2 4 1
Still, even someone who thinks that there's no reason to allow free
riding on trademarks, as opposed to business models, expired patents, and
the like, should consider that the cognition-based harms of dilution are
largely inflicted by noncommercial uses and uses that fall outside current
law. Protecting firms from marginal changes in the meaning of their marks
induced by some commercial uses, simply because it is the most the law can
do for them without harming free speech or suppressing legitimate
competition, is not that helpful and risks speech-suppressive errors and
wasteful litigation.242
B. Private Harm Versus Social Harm
Many have criticized dilution law on the ground that the game isn't
worth the candle. Even if dilution does harm to individual brands, trademark
owners litigate too many cases, resulting in a net social lOSS. 24 3 Especially if
we adopt a consumer-protection perspective on dilution, the fact that a par-
ticular trademark owner sues tells us nothing about whether consumers are
on balance harmed or benefited by changes in that mark's meaning.
My argument is not that trademark owners lack a legitimate interest in
whatever irrational responses marks trigger through Pavlovian conditioning.
That may be true, but dilution will often work in just as irrational and
comparative advertising, news reports on popular products and celebrities (and the ads surrounding
those reports), artistic appropriations, such as Andy Warhol's Campbell's Soup and Brillo
lithographs, and the placement of store brands next to major national brands to catch a budget-
minded shopper's eye.
240. TOM WOLFE, THE ELECTRIC KOOL-AID ACID TEST (Black Swan 1989) (1968).
241. AQUA, Barbie Girl, on AQUARIUM (MCA Records 1997).
242. Sheff argues that courts could adopt the cognitive model yet apply normative principles to
"wall off whole areas of human behavior from the reach of trademark liability, from utilitarian
spheres such as news reporting and keyword indexing to expressive spheres such as commentary,
criticism, parody, and appropriationist art." Sheff, supra note 9, at 384. Yet dilution's proponents
have not made the argument for going halfway. Even if allowing a single producer to control a
mark's meaning is more efficient than uncontrolled use, there is still no reason to think that an
intermediate regime, in which one producer plus a set of "free speech" users can affect meaning, is
preferable to a system without dilution protection, especially given the costs associated with
creating and enforcing legal rights.
243. See, e.g., McCarthy, supra note 54, at 747 ("[T]oo many courts have viewed antidilution
law as a quick and easy remedy to be applied whenever dilution theory says that injury to a famous
mark might occur [without requiring evidence of actual harm].").
[Vol. 86:507
Trademark Law and Cognitive Science
unconscious a fashion, putting diluters in not much better a moral position.244
Dilutive exploitation of consumers' conditioned responses, however,
produces consumer benefits as well as harms. If the food tastes better at
Tiffany's Restaurant-as the marketing literature indicates it might, just as
margarine wrapped in foil tastes better-patrons benefit.245
Rational trademark owners could overlitigate because stability in
trademark value is not necessarily associated with social welfare. Trademark
evangelists promise infinitely extended value from a carefully cultivated
brand,246 but the most perfectly nurtured mark can falter based on broader
social shifts. Consider Ovaltine. If the fame and positive associations of this
mark had substantial consumer benefits, then its relative desuetude would
represent a social loss. But, as Dennis Karjala has written, this is no more
true than the idea that decreased present-day demand for horses and buggies,
now that most people use mechanized transport, represents a social-welfare
lOSS. 247 People may or may not be happier with their beverages of choice
than they were seventy years ago, but the persistent meaning of particular
brands isn't the key to consumer satisfaction.
Even if exposure to Dogiva biscuits makes people prefer See's candy to
Godiva, a change in taste is not a decrease in consumer surplus, at least ab-
sent deception or some other resulting social harm like increased pollution,
and dilution law doesn't target such harms. 248 Especially given the overall
marketing thesis that trademark values are composed of intangibles, the con-
sumer who picks See's can be just as happy with her choice as she was with
her former favorite, Godiva.249 If we take seriously the idea that positive
244. See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 41 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that an
ad portraying John Deere's trademark buck as a small, cowardly creature likely violated New
York's antidilution law).
245. See Klerman, supra note 54, at 1767 (stating that social benefit from favorable
associations can outweigh social harm from increased searching costs).
246. See, e.g., Swann, Dilution Redefined, supra note 9, at 595 (arguing that brands are among
a company's most valuable assets and, properly managed, retain their value despite huge shifts in
the competitive environment); id. at 603-04 (contending that allowing trademark owners to control
meaning will help consumers).
247. Dennis S. Karjala, Congestion Externalities and Extended Copyright Protection, 94 GEO.
L.J. 1065, 1071-74 (2006). But cf id. at 1074-75, 1075 & n.19 (distinguishing trademark dilution
by accepting, though somewhat skeptically, that dilution causes consumer harm).
248. Sheffs analysis of dilution makes this clear, as he repeatedly indicates that the harm with
which he is concerned is that consumers will make decisions they "would not otherwise make"
because of free-riding uses. Sheff, supra note 9, at 376, 380. Different decisions are in themselves
neither good nor bad; they are simply different. One could argue that dilution is harmful in the
following way: Dilution changes consumers' emotional relations to a brand, making other
competing brands relatively more appealing. And diluters will target famous brands because they
will benefit most from free riding on famous brands. Thus, assuming there is a correlation between
fame and quality, a dilution-caused shift towards less famous brands will harm consumers. But this
is a fairly attenuated causal chain, and as discussed in the text, the malleability of quality judgments
suggests that dilution will make up on the swings what it loses in the roundabouts.
249. See Klerman, supra note 54, at 1770 (arguing that qualities of close competitors are likely
to be highly similar). Klerman does not specify whether he thinks the similarities will be perceptual
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judgments are generated by branding instead of by (or merely along with)
objective product attributes, as set forth in Part II, then Godiva's loss opens
up mental space for the consumer to accept See's promises instead.
In our personal lives, we may say things like "I don't know what I ever
saw in him," and loyal friends will respond, "I never liked him anyway."
These statements can be entirely sincere because memory is revisable, which
helps our evaluation of our new favorites and soothes the sting of losing the
old ones. More specifically to marketing, trying a product often encourages
us to like it, revising our preferences so that we are satisfied with the new
consumption choice, convinced that we have traded up.250  In such
circumstances, dilution that led to the abandonment of one brand and the
ascendance of another would not decrease consumer utility and might even
increase it.
In other words, there is a contradiction between the marketing theory
that supports dilution law-the idea that brand value inheres not in specific
qualities but in a mental shorthand that acquires its own apparatus of positive
feelings-and the idea that dilution harms consumers. If other marks are al-
ways prepared to provide a full complement of positive feelings, it is not
clear why a consumer suffers when one mark falls in her estimation relative
to others.251 Marketers' insistence that strong brands offer "unique selling
propositions" tend to focus on characteristics that are far from unique. Con-
sider how many different marks could replace Jerre Swann's examples:
The "unique" quality of a strong brand often is its ability to satisfy
emotional and self-expressive needs. A person can feel energetic
when drinking PEPSI, cool when driving a Chrysler 300C with a
HEMI engine, important while shopping at NORDSTROM, caring
when buying a HALLMARK card, and "arrived" when wearing a
ROLEX watch.252
or in some sense "objective," as we might deem the percentage of cocoa in chocolate to be. Given
that perceived quality is what changes with dilution, it should be easy for consumers to transfer their
good feelings from one brand to another if dilution really occurs.
250. See generally Hoch, supra note 176, at 451-52 (arguing that preferences are to a great
extent self-constructed, making product experiences more attractive ex post than ex ante).
251. See id. at 449, 451-52 (stating that consumers change their tastes so that they are happy
with what they are consuming). Given that most brands on the market have the objective qualities
required to satisfy consumers, the emotional benefits of branding can attach to any of them. See id.
at 450 ("Quality parity is the norm in many categories. Products in frequently purchased categories
have similar features and offer comparable levels of overall quality levels even when they are
distinguished by superficial attributes .... [T]he inherent ambiguity in many product experiences
can support interpretations that serve the consumer's best interests, whether that be a consistency
with prior knowledge (confirmation) or prior choices (status quo)." (citation omitted)).
252. Swann, Interdisciplinary Approach, supra note 9, at 952.
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Even in a static world, there would be alternative products to make us feel
energetic, cool, important, caring, and "arrived," and marketing is not
static.253
This argument against stability for its own sake ties back into the First
Amendment criticism. Compare the aim of dilution law, to allow trademark
owners to stabilize the meaning of a mark, with Justice Thomas's criticism of
regulations of advertised alcohol content: he argued that the "asserted interest
[in keeping] legal users of a product or service ignorant in order to manipu-
late their choices in the marketplace ... is per se illegitimate and can no
more justify regulation of 'commercial' speech than it can justify regulation
of 'noncommercial' speech. ' 54 In general, First Amendment doctrine favors
robust competition in the marketplace of ideas rather than simplification that
makes certain already-successful ideas easier to understand. 255 Dilution is a
doctrine that favors meanings approved by established producers above
meanings offered by challengers. It is anticompetitive, and to the extent that
truthful commercial speech promotes democratic values, antidemocratic.256
VI. Conclusion: Lessons for the Law
A. The Meaning of Dilution Law
Like many academics, I am no fan of dilution law. As the analysis
above indicates, I believe that present dilution laws should be found uncon-
stitutional under the Supreme Court's existing commercial-speech
jurisprudence. Courts have generally been much more forgiving of trade-
mark laws than of other regulations of commercial speech, however.25 7 If
this deference to legislative protections of "intellectual property" continues,
constitutional assault may not be the most effective way of responding to
dilution's new justifications. Thus, this section discusses nonconstitutional
253. See Richard Woods, Exploring the Emotional Territory for Brands, 3 J. CONSUMER
BEHAV. 388, 388 (2004) ("If only because of the relatively small number of primary emotions,
however, brands in the same sort of categories tend to stand for the same sort of emotions .... ").
254. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring).
255. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is the purpose of the First
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail,
rather than to countenance monopolization of that market .... ").
256. Dilution cases are brought by private parties. But so are libel cases, and their systematic
effects on speech still justify First Amendment scrutiny. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 265 (1964).
257. See, e.g., S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 539 (1987)
(upholding a statutory provision allowing the United States Olympic Committee to prohibit the
commercial use of the word Olympic without proving that such use was likely to be confusing);
Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 398 (8th Cir. 1987) (affirming the district court's
finding of infringement based on the likelihood of confusion between Mutual of Omaha's registered
trademark "Indian head" logo and Novak's "Mutant of Omaha" design, which depicted a "feather-
bonneted, emaciated human head"); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd.,
604 F.2d 200, 206-07 (2d Cir. 1979) (upholding a preliminary injunction prohibiting the
distribution of the film Debbie Does Dallas).
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limiting strategies that flow from recognizing the empirical weakness of the
cognitive model of dilution.
1. Resisting Expansion.-The research discussed in this Article appears
to allow us to get inside the mind and induces in marketers a fantasy of con-
trol of consumer perception. If cognitive science were the answer to the
long-standing question "What is dilution?," then many aspects of the current
dilution doctrine would have to be reassessed. At the extreme, the vision of
owning the customer could be used to justify legal control over all uses of a
mark to ensure that only the associations the trademark owner approves of
get made. An ownership claim has difficulty distinguishing among types of
interferences with trademark owners' enjoyment of their properties, whether
by competitors, noncompetitors, or consumers' own opinions.
The cognitive model's proponents already recognize that their theory
justifies expanding federal dilution law substantially. 258  The first obvious
change would be to use dilution to protect less-famous marks because the
evidence shows that famous marks are more likely to resist dilution of their
own force. The most careful studies finding dilution effects use marks that
would probably not succeed with federal dilution claims. Pullig and his
colleagues, for example, tested the effects of identical marks on Big Red
gum, Trix cereal, and Gap khakis.259 Gap khakis were tested using a product
category in which the trademark owner already has a registration, making
dilution protection unnecessary.260 The other two marks, Big Red and Trix,
are unlikely to qualify for federal dilution protection because of the large
number of similar or identical marks already in use on other products.26' Yet
258. See Sheff, supra note 9, at 375 ("[S]trict adherence to a behavioralist model of trademark
liability has the potential to greatly broaden the scope of such liability .....
259. Pullig et al., supra note 65, at 63.
260. See id. at 63. There are only a few marks registered under the name Gap that are not
owned by Gap Inc., though a large number of other marks incorporate the word Gap as part of a
longer name. See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Trademark Electronic Search System (TESS),
http://tess2.uspto.gov/bin/gate.exe?ftess&state=lhshsb.1.1 (providing a searchable database of
U.S. trademarks and listing 360 live registered marks that include the word Gap when it was
searched on May 18, 2006). The dilutive brand Pullig et al. tested, Gap stain-resistant sheets, falls
within Gap Inc.'s registration number 2341527, which includes bed sheets. See id. Because Gap
competes in this category, a trademark infringement claim against Gap stain-resistant sheets would
almost certainly succeed.
261. Big Red gum showed significant effects from dilution by Big Red snack bars. See Pullig
et al., supra note 65, at 57-58. Yet the name consists of two highly descriptive terms, which limits
its protectability. In a search of the electronic trademark-registration records on November 10,
2006, I found numerous live registered Big Red marks for products including industrial cleaners,
soft drinks, pet food, lottery services, equipment switches, work benches, chicken sandwiches,
wine, chewing tobacco, and thermometers. There are also a number of marks incorporating Big
Red, such as Clifford the Big Red Dog marks for numerous goods, including cakes and lip balm.
Cornell and the University of Wisconsin also use Big Red as a nickname. The large number of
other users is not surprising, since many people can have good reasons to use the descriptive term
Big Red. Big Red soda and wine and Clifford the Big Red Dog food products are highly similar to
the hypothetical products Pullig et al. tested, meaning the Big Red mark is prediluted and subject to
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if lawmakers agree with Pullig and his colleagues that their results corre-
spond to the legal concept of trademark dilution, then the fame requirement
is too high a bar and many more marks should receive dilution protection.
Likewise, in a study that proposed standards for determining dilution,
Morrin and her colleagues tested eight different brands, none of which
should qualify as famous.262 Most obviously, immediately after being ex-
posed to Parker pens, Viking computers, and Gibson greeting cards, more
than half the respondents in the nondiluted condition failed to remember
them, indicating that those marks had only limited actual distinctiveness.263
Even the marks that respondents remembered well after exposure-Ace,
Bass, Kiwi, Mercury, and Pioneer-are poor candidates for federal
protection.264 These eight marks are laudatory (Ace, Pioneer), personal
names (Parker, Bass, Gibson), or common words with nontrademark
meaning (Kiwi, Mercury, Viking), all of which have generally been available
for others' nonconfusing uses.
Despite the good reasons for that availability, Morrin and her colleagues
advocate extending dilution protection to marks like these to ensure that "the
first user owns that brand name in the consumer's memory, rather than hav-
ing to share associations with other product categories. 265 Thus, because
competing associations with other product attributes. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(iii) (West
Supp. 2007) (directing courts in dilution cases to consider "[t]he extent to which the owner of the
famous mark is engaging in substantially exclusive use of the mark"). Big Red soda is particularly
popular in Texas and is said to taste like bubble gum. See Joe Nick Patoski, Big Red, TEXAS
MONTHLY, Aug. 1986, at 120, 120-21, available at http://www.texasmonthly.com/ranch/readme/
bigred.php (noting that "[t]he only beverage that consistently outsells Big Red in San Antonio is
Coca-Cola," and describing the taste as "something like liquid bubble gum"); Big Red Soda - The
BevNET.com Review, http://www.bevnet.com/reviews/bigred ("If we ever had a beverage that
tastes just like bubble gum, this is it.").
As for Trix, there are only five other live registered Trix marks in the database (tick removal,
office furniture, model trains, leather desk accessories, and rubber hoses), but a significant number
of other marks incorporate Trix, from Snak Trix (fishing lures) to Glowtrix (styling aid) to Pix &
Trix (toys). An additional use that evoked the meaning of tricks would have a strong claim to be
nondiluting. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 221 (2d Cir. 1999) ("It is a
generally accepted principle of the trademark law, furthermore, that a senior claim to a mark does
not bar a junior from using the same words (or symbols) comprising the mark in their descriptive
sense.").
262. See Morrin et al., supra note 87, at 251 (listing the eight brands as "Parker pens, Ace
hardware stores, Kiwi shoe polish, Bass ale, Gibson greeting cards, Viking computer components,
Mercury automobiles, and Pioneer audio equipment").
263. See id. at 252 tbl.2 (listing the percentage of members of the "undiluted" control group
who could recall the first user as 49.1% for Parker, 13.2% for Gibson, and 45.3% for Viking).
264. See id. (listing the percentage of members of the "undiluted" group who could recall the
first user as 90.6% for Ace, 60.4% for Kiwi, 77.4% for Bass, 98.1% for Mercury, and 85.8% for
Pioneer).
265. Id. at 251. Morrin et al. tested Parker pens as the first user, id., though Parker Brothers
games (the dilutive use) appear to have beaten the pens to the market by a year; Parker Brothers'
first use of its mark in commerce was 1888, see The Story of Parker Brothers, http://www.
hasbro.com/default.cfn?page=ci-history-pb, whereas Parker pens entered the market in 1889, see
The History of Parker Pens, http://www.parkerpen.com/en/discovery/making-of/timeline. The
bigger question, of course, is what harm this century plus of coexistence has done to either,
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exposure to Ace uniforms reduced the number of people who thought only of
Ace hardware stores when shortly thereafter exposed to the mark Ace,
dilution protection should be broadened (presumably also to bar Ace
bandages).266 The procompetitive reasons for allowing multiple nonconfus-
ing marks still exist, but the apparently objective evidence of dilution-
evidence that a trademark owner lacks "ownership" of mental processes it
could theoretically enjoy-provides a new reason for propertizing words that
were formerly available to other producers in search of terms to describe or
praise their own businesses.
Other proposals for expanding dilution law use cognitive theory to
advocate that the law should protect marks that are only well recognized
among a subset of consumers,267 bar all free riding as well as blurring and
tarnishment,268 prohibit retailers' common practice of using packaging for
house brands that imitates the dominant national brand,269 and otherwise
maximize protection for distinctive marks.27° Protecting a brand's image,
rather than its association with a source or even its association with particular
qualities, 27' requires an ever-expanding law-which, among other things,
would have little tolerance for parody, comparative advertising, negative
reviews, or unusual children's names.
These are all bad ideas. So far, the evidence in favor of the cognitive
model is not persuasive enough to justify realigning doctrine around it. Con-
sumers are not passive recipients of meaning injected by marketing and
likely never will be no matter how much marketing science improves, if only
regardless of who was first. The other dilutive marks in Morrin et al.'s study have also been around
for decades.
266. See Morrin et al., supra note 87, at 253 (arguing that because familiarity provides
resistance to dilution, a high-fame requirement means that few of the brands entitled to federal
dilution protection will ever suffer harm from dilution, and thus fame should be interpreted
generously).
267. See Swann, Interdisciplinary Approach, supra note 9, at 967-68. Unsurprisingly, Swann
cites Morrin & Jacoby, supra note 49, for the proposition that a competitor's use of Tiffany's blue
color could dilute Tiffany's brand value. Swann, Interdisciplinary Approach, supra note 9, at 968
n.163. All else aside, this is a misapplication of their research, which deals with products in
noncompeting, distinct categories; other dilution researchers have noted that imitation of similar
products can reinforce rather than dilute. See, e.g., Pullig et al., supra note 65, at 62.
268. See Swann, Interdisciplinary Approach, supra note 9, at 970 ("Elevating free riding to a
stand-alone vice may thus give modem strong brands the protection that they may not receive under
current concepts.").
269. See id. at 970-71.
270. See id. at 976 ("For the present needs of strong marks, it is likely that precedent already
exists to prevent trading on their elaborate networks .... To the extent that precedent is deemed
not to exist, the common law flexibility of unfair competition must be revived with an infusion from
modem marketing and cognitive psychology...."). As Graeme Dinwoodie and Mark Janis have
pointed out, the fame requirement has little connection to the search-costs rationale for dilution.
Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 186, at 100. It is thus reasonable for dilution's proponents to seek to
relax the fame requirement.
271. See Swam, Interdisciplinary Approach, supra note 9, at 972 ("Just as trademarks have
evolved, we have moved legally from source as king to the salience of quality; we should now move
to brand imagery as an object of trademark concern.").
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because of competition among marketers themselves that will allow consum-
ers some space for choice. There is no prelapsarian state of purely controlled
information flow to which a properly configured dilution law could return us.
Moreover, even if the cognitive model were proven, dilution law in
anything like its current form could never address the harms the model
identifies. Given the important policy objectives that the current limits and
exceptions serve-mainly promoting competition and preserving freedom of
speech-Congress is unlikely to expand dilution to cover most currently un-
regulated diluting uses. Rather than justifying the intuitions that drive
dilution law, then, cognitive science exposes the gap between dilution theory
and market and political realities.
Mark McKenna has recently put forth a powerful historical argument
tracing the evolution of the values that trademark is said to promote.272
Trademark law originally protected trademark owners against lost sales
caused by infringing marks on competing products.273 Over time, the con-
cept of trademark expanded to cover harm to "goodwill" when consumers
were confused about the relationship between marks on noncompeting goods
and then to protect brand value generally.274 The idea of protecting consum-
ers has consistently encouraged new theories of liability because courts have
consistently discovered new sources of potential consumer harm.275
Currently, postsale confusion; confusion on the part of nonconsumers, such
as investors; and initial interest confusion all support liability for trademark
infringement on the theory that they protect purchasers from deception as
well as support producer interests.
Dilution is supposedly the next step in consumer protection. We should
not take that step. Instead, we should reaffirm the competing interests that
trademark law serves-interests in fair competition and the availability of
useful terms to multiple producers.276 Infinitely expanding trademark
owners' rights in the name of consumer protection is a mistake and will
ultimately harm consumers by hampering competition.
2. Providing Administrable and Rational Limits.-Because the search-
costs model is so deeply flawed but also so attractive, dilution law needs ex-
ternal limits to structure it in harm-minimizing ways. The concept that
dilution law only bans the use of a trademark as a mark for a defendant's
own goods or services offers a limit on dilution that solves a number of
272. See McKenna, supra note 32.
273. Id. at 1841.
274. Id. at 1910-11.
275. See generally Bartow, supra note 224 (discussing persistent judicial concepts of
consumers as vulnerable to confusion of all kinds).
276. See Rebecca Tushnet, Why the Customer Isn't Always Right: Producer-Based Limits on
Rights Accretion in Trademark, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 352 (2007), http://yalelawjournal.org/
2007/04/25/tushnet.html (discussing doctrines that limit the rights of trademark owners in order to
protect the free use of terms helpful to other producers).
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problems.277 Still, it is important to recognize that "use as a mark" uncouples
the law from actual determinants of marks' meaning. At the extreme, it is
possible to create associations that affect the evaluation of a product simply
by putting it in proximity with another product. 278 Use of one famous mark
in a category, such as Adidas for athletic shoes, can even activate thoughts of
other famous marks in that category, such as Nike. 279 One of the main analo-
gies used in keyword-search cases-the common grocery-store practice of
stocking house brands next to popular national brands-involves a use of the
selling power of the national brand, though not a "use" in the current sense
trademark law gives to that term.280  This sensitivity of marks to context
raises the specter of dilution any time there might be an effect on consumers'
mental models of a trademark's meaning. If dilution cannot be extirpated
from the law, bright-line rules guarding against expansion beyond a small
core of specific uses might be good coping mechanisms.
One interpretation of dilution that does not require reliance on
expansive and unproven theories about consumers' mental states was set
forth by the First Circuit in an early case interpreting the original federal di-
lution law: when a mark is unique and famous, others may be barred from
using that mark or an indistinguishable variant to identify their own goods
and services. 281  High standards for fame, uniqueness, and near identicality
between the senior and junior marks provide limits on the concept of dilution
and may allow courts to bar objectionable free riding without expensive and
uncertain evidentiary battles.282 Such a dilution regime might not do much
good, but it wouldn't do much harm either.
277. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 188 (discussing the new "use as a mark" requirements in
federal dilution law); cf Sheff, supra note 9, at 384 (recognizing the expansiveness of the
associationist model and suggesting trademark use as a normative limit). For a critique of
trademark use as a bright-line limit on the scope of trademark law, see Graeme B. Dinwoodie &
Mark D. Janis, Confusion over Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597
(2007).
278. See Kronlund & Bernstein, supra note 192, at 684 (discussing the results of a study on the
effects of sequential exposure to brands); Levin & Levin, supra note 193, at 47-49 (discussing the
effects of physical proximity on restaurant evaluations).
279. Swam, Dilution Redefined, supra note 9, at 608.
280. See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through
Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1669, 1692-93 (2007) (using this analogy). Eric Goldman has
investigated the numerous ways in which retailers and others can "use" trademarks to create value
for themselves, including placement within stores as well as placement of the stores themselves to
draw value from nearby stores. See Goldman, supra note 191. Kardes et al. also found that the
physical presence of one brand could suppress recognition of other brands and suggested that this
effect could be manipulated by prominent placement in stores. Kardes et al., supra note 197, at 143.
281. See I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 45-46 (1st Cir. 1998).
282. See id. at 45-50 (applying stringent standards for fame and dilution and reversing the
district court's grant of a temporary injunction on a dilution claim); ef Farley, supra note 38, at
111-12 (arguing that dilution is unreal and unprovable and that dilution law is really about
preventing unfair free riding, although a sufficient definition of what is unfair is lacking).
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B. The Meaning of Cognitive Science
Cognitive science offers a seemingly objective explanation of a
perplexing legal doctrine. It is thus in trademark owners' interest to present
new measures of dilution as analogous to fingerprint evidence-new data
supporting the identification of guilty parties without changing the underly-
ing crime. The use of cognitive evidence, however, may prove to be far
more like the application of economics to antitrust, which led courts to revisit
the question of what counted as a harm to competition, and thus as a viola-
tion of the law, in the first instance.283 In antitrust, vague statutory language
lent itself to judicial interpretation, at first used to attack various business
practices perceived as wrongful. 284 Once economics entered the picture, the
focus shifted to maximizing "efficiency," an overarching principle that could
be used to give content to the underdefined statutory language. 285 The same
is true of dilution: vague statutory language has for a long time been used
rather haphazardly to suppress practices courts see as unfair free riding. Ju-
dicial dissatisfaction with the absence of a clear theory of dilution has,
however, hampered the doctrine's expansion. Cognitive theories offer to
play the same role as economics in antitrust-simultaneously explaining and
changing the cause of action, but this time expanding it rather than contract-
ing it.28
6
Jennifer Mnookin has argued that even apparently objective categories
of evidence, such as fingerprint matching and handwriting identification,
283. See generally MARC ALLEN EISNER, ANTITRUST AND THE TRIUMPH OF ECONOMICS 228-
31 (1991) (discussing the ascendance of economics in antitrust policy and judicial decision making);
John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White, Introduction to THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION:
ECONOMICS, COMPETITION, AND POLICY 1, 1, 1-5 (John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds.,
3d ed. 1999) (describing the "economic revolution in antitrust" and the emergent role of economics
in court decisions interpreting antitrust law and policy).
284. See EISNER, supra note 283, at 228-29 (discussing how courts and agencies gave
substantive content to the vague economic and policy goals of the Sherman Act); Kwoka & White,
supra note 283, at 1 ("Throughout, [antitrust] diligently pursued what it perceived to be predatory
conduct by large companies against smaller rivals and new entrants.").
285. See Kwoka & White, supra note 283, at 2 ("Efficiency, [the Chicago School] has
maintained, is what the plain language of the law implies and in any event is the only objective that
can sensibly be pursued."); see also EISNER, supra note 283, at 229, 229-31 ("Economics could
contribute an organizing paradigm for judicial decision making [in antitrust cases] .... It could
furnish simple decision rules for selecting cases and suggest which data were most appropriate to
reveal the effects of a given restraint."). In many cases, conceiving of antitrust law in rigorous
economic terms had the effect of limiting the available causes of action. Courts and agency
officials have taken a more permissive view of megamergers, price-fixing schemes, and especially
vertical integration after economics began reshaping the doctrine. See Kwoka & White, supra note
283, at 2-3.
286. Cf Kevin Emerson Collins, Cybertrespass and Trespass to Documents, 54 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 41, 47-48 (2006) (discussing the ways in which conceiving of electronic signals as newly
detectable small particles, analogous to previously unmeasurable environmental pollution, enabled
courts to create expansive doctrines of trespass to chattels in cyberspace that pose substantially
different risks to free expression and competition than trespass to chattels traditionally did).
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reflect the social construction of reliability. 8 7 Judges had some discomfort
with handwriting identification, but given that authorship of documents was
often an issue and that there was rarely any other type of evidence available,
they were under enormous pressure to declare it reliable enough to admit.2 88
The analogy to psychological evidence of dilution, when dilution is other-
wise an obscure concept, should be a cautionary one. Cognitive theories may
be the best of a bad lot, but we have the option of rejecting the entire lot
rather than adopting the least rotten theory.
As Mnookin points out, moreover, the fact that fingerprint and
handwriting experts worked almost exclusively for police and prosecutors
had systematic effects on the new evidence's meaning for defendants. 89
Similarly, like ordinary consumer surveys, cognitive-science-based evidence
about particular trademarks is expensive to collect, leading to its asymmetri-
cal availability. The underlying science is also shaped by demand. If the
Coca-Cola Company can fund its own neuroscience but consumer groups
can't, the questions and answers in the research will be focused on the needs
of already-successful producers.
Rather than simply codifying old intuitions, the process of providing
new explanations for old labels changes the set of things to which the labels
are applied. This is a process fraught with danger both for nonlegal
disciplines, which may find themselves manipulated for litigation purposes,
and for the law, whose categories may not be compatible with those of other
disciplines. The cognitive model of dilution is an example of a legal theory
that, in claiming scientific truth, has overstated its basis in both science and
law. In a complex, dynamic system like that of trademark law, there are no
magic bullets, or magic MRIs.
287. See generally Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA Profiling, 67
BROOK. L. REv. 13 (2001) [hereinafter Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence] (tracing fmgerprinting's
rapid acceptance by the courts and the public); Jennifer L. Mnookin, Scripting Expertise: The
History of Handwriting Identification Evidence and the Judicial Construction of Reliability, 87 VA.
L. REv. 1723 (2001) [hereinafter Mnookin, Scripting Expertise] (discussing the rise and fall of
handwriting identification as a science).
288. Mnookin, Scripting Expertise, supra note 287, at 1728.
289. See Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence, supra note 287, at 42-43; Mnookin, Scripting
Expertise, supra note 287, at 1783-84.
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